I have previously pointed out the craziness of the epistemic standard that is being deployed against Donald Trump in the election-interference cases. The epistemic standard in question is the belief, or more precisely the assumption, universally shared by Trump's opponents, that it's unreasonable to believe that the 2020 election was stolen. Here's an innocuous-seeming but flagrantly question-begging recent example from The Bulwark: "The widespread conspiracy to overthrow the 2020 election, depicted in both the federal Washington, D.C. indictment and the Fulton County, Georgia indictment, was an attack on the foundations of the republic."

This is to assume what must be proved. What must be proved, in order for the anti-Trump unreasonableness postulate to be justified (i.e., that it's unreasonable to believe the 2020 election was stolen), is the assumption that the election clearly was not stolen. This assumption is inherent in the anti-Trump unreasonableness postulate. That postulate is not merely pervasive but universal among Trump's enemies, including among some members of the Federalist Society.