This article is another in that series.

China's pressure on Taiwan and Russia's assault on Ukraine demonstrate the deterioration of the Eurasian security. In turn, Congress and the military have at least recognized the implications of the threats the U.S. faces. But budgetary constraints, Congressional gridlock, and a poor sense of precise threat have limited America's ability to build up its military forces and confront its enemies. It is thus crucial to invest in the long-term enabling capabilities that ensure U.S. strategic superiority. A real Alaskan communications network that circumvallated the state and connected to its outlying islands in the Bering Strait and Northern Pacific, would enhance deterrence in the long run at only limited cost.

Despite over two years of war in Ukraine, the threat from Russia has not diminished. In some respects, it has grown, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. The Russian Army may have been savaged in Ukraine and will be largely incapable of matching NATO forces for the coming half-decade at least, if not longer. But the Russian air force and navy maintain robust conventional and nuclear strike capabilities. Of notable relevance – as American strategists understood in the Cold War – is Russia's nuclear submarine bastion in the northern Pacific's Sea of Okhotsk. Russian submarines secure Moscow's second-strike from here, supported by heavy bombers. Russia has also conducted several naval exercises in the Arctic and Bering Strait, including last autumn, when Russian warships conducted missile tests near the U.S.-Russia maritime boundary line. With a new European Cold War threatening to turn hot, Alaskan territorial defense is now more critical than at any time since the 1980s.

The China challenge, moreover, increases the strategic importance of Alaska to U.S. policy. While Beijing is unlikely to assault Taiwan soon, owing to a combination of military unpreparedness, economic disruption, and a broader pressure strategy against the island-republic, a confrontation between China and the U.S. over the Indo-Pacific's future is nearly guaranteed in the next decade. China may prefer to absorb Taiwan absent a full-scale war with the U.S., but if it begins to apply pressure to Taiwan, it will be willing to climb the escalation ladder to major combat, particularly since – unlike the Soviets in 1962 – China has a chance to win a war with the U.S..  In turn, during any major conflict, critical U.S. bases will be on the Chinese target list, namely Okinawa, Yokosuka, and Guam, and perhaps even Pearl Harbor. By destroying U.S. regional logistical infrastructure, China can buy the time it needs to overwhelm Taiwan, and even pressure Japan and the Philippines into submission.