If there is one thing the WeWork fiasco has taught us, it is that cracks in many legacy narratives - most notably that of "growth at any cost" over "profits and margins" - are starting to finally appear and affect investment decisions: just ask SoftBank's Masayoshi Son who in the span of just a few months has transformed from one of Wall Street's most admired investors to a pariah who not only does not understand simple fundamentals and instead like a clueless teenage girl chases after tall dudes with silky, long hair even if that means billions in losses, but will throw his investors under the bus just to chase a vanity investment to its bitter chapter-11 end.

But if one digs deeper, WeWork's house of shared office space came crashing down only after it became clear that the primary source of its heretofore unlimited growth, virtually unlimited cash spending by both companies and investors, was coming to an end, something which Goldman showed finally took place this year, as the total change in cash spending - including spending on CapEx as well as buybacks and dividends - in Q2 plunged 13% Y/Y. It's is hardly a coincidence that that's when WeWork's troubles first emerged, and when its bankers scrambled to take the company public.