But "Operation Merlin" itself was also on trial. The CIA was hoping that testimony by prosecution witnesses and a series of declassified CIA cables introduced as evidence would show that Risen's account was wrong in recounting that the CIA's human asset "Merlin" had immediately spotted a flaw in the plans to be turned over to Iran that Iranian engineers might be able to spot as well. 

The cables reporting the incident and "Merlin's" testimony both indicate that what "Merlin" saw was not a flaw in the schematics of the device, but a discrepancy between the schematics and the parts list accompanying it that would cause the Iranians to doubt the asset's cover story. 

But the evidence also reveals a larger story of a half-baked operation dreamed up by weapons specialists and managers who were ignorant of the most basic facts about the Iranians and their nuclear program. They created a cover story or "legend" for the Russian émigré scientist "asset" now known as "Merlin" that was so questionable that he never believed the Iranians would fall for it. 

The exercise was pointless, moreover. The CIA did not claim that Iran had a nuclear weapons program when the planning of the operation began in 1996, and continued to offer no firm conclusion about Iran's nuclear intentions through 1998.