JOHN STUART, *Pro per* 10407 W. Trumbull Road 1 2 Tolleson, Arizona (85353) Phone # (480) 232-0606 <themobinem@aol.com> 3 John Stuart, Sui Juris 4 Authorized Representative 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 **DISTRICT OF ARIZONA** 8 JOHN STUART, Case No. CV-10-44-PHX-ROS 9 Plaintiff, VS. 10 **Paul McMurdie**, individually, and in his 11 official capacity as a Judge of the Maricopa County Superior Court, State Of Arizona; 12 RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS and Susie Charbel, individually, and in her 13 CHARBEL AND LYON'S MOTION TO official capacity as a Prosecutor of the 14 County of Maricopa, State Of Arizona; and **DISMISS COMPLAINT**; Paul Dalton, individually, and in his 15 official capacity as a Police Detective of the AND 16 City of Phoenix, State of Arizona; and Al 17 PETITION FOR SUMMARY **Shearer**, individually, and in his official capacity as a Police Detective of the City of 18 JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF Phoenix, State of Arizona; and John 19 **Johnson**, individually, and in his official **PLAINTIFF** 20 capacity as a Public Defender of the 21 Maricopa County Superior Court, State Of Arizona; and **Tyler Harrison**, individually, 22 and in his official capacity as a Public 23 Defender of the Maricopa County Superior 24 Court, State Of Arizona; and Robert E. (Trial by Jury Demanded) **Lyon, DO,** individually, and in his official 25 capacity as Maricopa County Medical (Assigned to the Hon. Roslyn O. Silver) 26 Examiner, State Of Arizona 27 **Defendants**

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Representative and beneficiary for JOHN STUART, appearing specially and not generally, *vi et armis*, claiming, exercising and invoking ALL RIGHTS including but not limited to God granted Rights, human Rights, and all Rights guaranteed and protected by the united States Constitution, the Arizona Constitution, and International Treaties. Plaintiff adapts and incorporates herein by reference as if fully set forth, the entire Maricopa County Superior Court case CR2008-106594-001DT Court file including, but not limited to, all Minute Entries, Rulings and Orders, the entire docket, and submits the following facts, law and authority as basis for and in support of this pleading.

In the name of God, with the gaze of Our Lord, JOHN STUART, ens legis, by

and through his authorized representative, a separate entity, John Stuart, Authorized

Pro Se/pro per Standards

Pursuant to the Supreme Court of the United States, *pro se/prop per* pleadings MAY NOT be held to the same standard as a lawyer's and/or attorney's; and whose motions, pleadings and all papers may ONLY be judged by their function and never their form. Plaintiff is considered *pro per* as the court again violated, *inter alia*, Rule 6.3(c). Pro se are exempt from dismissal for form not function and pro se Petitions cannot be dismissed without the court allowing the opportunity for the pro se litigant to correct the Petition; AND the court MUST inform the pro se litigant of the Petitions deficiency; AND instruct pro se on the necessary instructions; AND the pro se litigant may introduce any evidence in support of his Petition.

Pro se litigants are held to less stringent pleading standards than admitted or licensed bar attorneys. Regardless of the deficiencies in their pleadings, pro se litigants are entitled to the opportunity to submit evidence in support of their claims. See *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519-421.

Court errs if court dismisses the *pro se* litigant without instruction of how pleadings are deficient and how to repair pleadings.

See *Platsky v. C.I.A.*, 953 f.2d. 25.

Litigants' constitutional (guaranteed) rights are violated when courts depart from precedent where parties are similarly situated. See *Anastasoff v. United States*, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000);

Governing Rules of this Case

This case is governed by, *inter alia*, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, *inter alia*, the United States Code, *inter alia*, the united States Constitution, *inter alia*, the Arizona Constitution, *inter alia*, the Treaty of Paris of 1781, *inter alia*, the Hague Convention, *inter alia*, ALL other human rights treaties, and all estoppels on government agencies and/or agents, and others. These Rules and Laws have not been abrogated.

Invocation of Rights

Plaintiff invokes ALL Rights; including but not limited to, God granted Rights, Constitutionally Protected Rights, and Human Rights as defined and Protected by ALL Treaties enforced by the United States and/or THE UNITED STATES and/or THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Declaration of Status and Character

JOHN STUART is the *ens legis* created *vi et armis* by the "State" and John Chester of the family Stuart ("John Stuart") is a natural flesh and blood bondservant of God authorized to represent the interest of JOHN STUART. John Stuart, *a natural living man*, cannot by Constitution, Law and/or Treaty be held liable in any court anywhere in anyway for JOHN STUART, *ens legis*.

Pursuant to, *inter alia*, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, JOHN STUART, [STUART or "Plaintiff"] through undersigned agent, *sui juris*, declares and alleges for the record the following in response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss:

Any and all claims by Defendant(s) of Plaintiff's violation of time limits are nullified by Defendants' ongoing persecution of Plaintiff that has greatly limited and interfered with Plaintiff's ability to bring any action against Defendant(s). Plaintiff has been falsely imprisoned for eight months for a crime that has a maximum sentence of four months. Plaintiff has also been threatened numerous times by Defendant(s) with being held in contempt of court if He files any pleadings in an attempt to secure His constitutional and/or Substantive Rights. In essence, Defendant(s) have unlawfully used their authority under color of state law to deprive Plaintiff of His Civil Rights, and Defendant(s) have unlawfully used their authority under color of state law to prevent Plaintiff from obtaining remedy for Defendant(s) violations.

The absurdness of Defendant(s)' actions are beyond what any reasonable person could possibly comprehend. Defendant(s) have conducted themselves as a criminal enterprise using threats, kidnapping, perjury, and torture under color of state law to protect their previous and ongoing criminal activities.

As recently as on or about February 4, 2010, the new Judge Maria del Mar Verdin that was assigned to the case on or about January 29, 2010, entered an unsigned Minute Entry into the court's record unlawfully purging ALL Petitions entered by Plaintiff (Defendant in that matter, Superior Court case CR2008-106594-001DT) in an effort to assist the prosecution. Plaintiff had no attorney of record in that matter at that time and

was therefore pro se. The new judge's first action in the matter is a criminal act in furtherance of Defendant(s) previous criminal acts. The purged Petitions cannot possibly be answered truthfully by the prosecution and therefore the new judge in the case is also conspiring with Defendant(s) to deprive Plaintiff of His Civil Rights under color of state law and color of authority.

The behavior of EVERY judge in this matter has been part of the criminal conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of His Civil Rights. Plaintiff hereby informs this court of the actions of previous judges as an "offer of proof" for the record, and Plaintiff Declares the allegations are true:

- 1. Judge Ryan, without cause and without reason raised Plaintiff's bond, even though Plaintiff had not violated ANY aspect of the bond, on order's from County Attorney Andrew Thomas who stated publicly that He would see to it that Plaintiff's bond was raised;
- Judge Stienle ordered that ALL attorneys MUST file a Notice of Appearance BEFORE representing Plaintiff yet ALL other judge's after Baca allowed attorneys to Trespass on Plaintiff's case in detriment to Plaintiff, without filing a Notice of Appearance;
- Judge Baca issued a fraudulent arrest warrant for Plaintiff based on perjurous statements made by Charbel during the "investigatory phase" whereas Charbel was acting as an "investigator" and not as a "prosecutor" and therefore are **not** protected by "absolute and/or qualified immunity";

- 4. Commissioner Mroz said in open court "this is not a crime, why is he here" yet did not dismiss the case against Plaintiff (concerning prosecuting Plaintiff for his attorney entering documents into the case);
- Judge Stienle signed and issued an order "releasing Defendant from ALL liability" concerning the murder charge then allowed the prosecution to seal the order;
- **6.** Judge McMurdie repeatedly threatened Plaintiff to prevent Plaintiff from speaking in open court;
- 7. Judge McMurdie refused to allow Plaintiff to waive His Sixth Amendment Right to counsel and forced Plaintiff to have counsel;
- **8.** Judge McMurdie unlawfully continued the case numerous times after the "last day of trial" had lapsed;
- **9.** Judge McMurdie unlawfully forced Plaintiff into a Rule 11 Examination without cause and in violation of A.R.Crim.P Rule 11.2;

The extent of the conspiracy reaches to and also includes County Attorney Andrew Thomas who has made inappropriate and prejudicial statements to the media concerning Plaintiff. The obvious fact that Thomas is personally involved and directing the conspiracy yet can shield himself unlawfully using the power of his office, has made it impossible for the Plaintiff to receive any justice and/or Due Process in the matter.

Defendant(s) have thus made it completely impossible for the Plaintiff to receive a fair and impartial trial and remove any possibility Plaintiff has of securing a viable defense against the prosecutorial misconduct. It is obvious the new judge is attempting to prevent

any future appeal by purposely not signing the Minute Entry. Such is prima facie evidence of the new judge's desire to continue the conspiracy started by the previous judge.

Prosecutor Charbel is as repugnant to justice and human rights as was Saddam Hussein. Charbel's attempted use of "absolute immunity" outside of its scope is prima facie evidence of her evil intent. For Defendant(s) to allow the numerous violations committed by Charbel to continue unfettered is tantamount to Defendant(s)' admission that prosecutors are above the law and the government is nothing more than a sadistic master to the citizen slaves.

There appears to be some confusion on the Defendant(s)' part as to where Maricopa County Superior Court is located. Plaintiff will therefore attempt to clarify the location and jurisdiction of Maricopa County Superior Court:

Maricopa County Superior Court is an Article IV, *not an Article III*, court and is convened on land within Arizona, one of these United States as defined in the constitution for these United States of America, *circa 1781*.

There is Nothing Constitutional about Immunity: In Mason v. Melendez, 525 F. Supp. 270 at 275 (USDC Wisconsin, 1981), Judge Doyle opined:

"Immunity from damages, whether absolute or qualified, represents a sharp departure from the principle that persons are responsible for the harm they inflict upon one another, and that the victims may seek compensation from the perpetrators."

Maricopa County Superior Court is NOT in IRAN, IRAQ, CHINA, or any other such totalitarian nation, and accordingly "immunity" is ONLY available to persons acting within the confines of the law and while conducting themselves within the

confines of their job description. While it is true that in IRAN, IRAQ, and China, state agents have immunity for their unlawful acts, no such immunity exists in Arizona.

Defendant Charbel also appears to be confused as to when "Absolute Immunity" applies to prosecutor's actions. SCOTUS decisions are clear that "absolute immunity" ONLY applies to effects in and of trial, and NEVER to investigations. Since there was no trial concerning the confiscation of bond caused by Charbel's perjury there can be no "absolute immunity" for Charbel is that matter. Charbel may have been able to claim "qualified immunity" as any investigator may, but "qualified immunity" does not protect an investigator that knowingly commits perjury under color of state law and/or color of authority. Charbel did not claim "qualified immunity" for her criminal acts.

Although it may seem strange to laymen that prosecutors are protected when they commit perjury to falsely convict an innocent man, yet they are not protected when they only have the innocent man arrested, such has been the decisions by SCOTUS.

Irrespective of how abhorrent the fact that prosecutors are allowed to falsely convict thousands of innocent people with impunity, prosecutors are still not allowed to commit felonies to have innocent people falsely arrested pursuant to numerous SCOTUS decisions.

Charbel will accordingly claim that she can commit perjury to have innocent people falsely arrested, yet her claim cannot stand in light of the appropriate SCOUTS decisions.

The phrases "absolute immunity," "qualified immunity" and/or "immunity" do not appear in the Constitution, nor does it appear in Title 42 Section 1983, a part of the federal criminal code that provides a way for citizens to collect damages against the government.

The Court read absolute immunity into the law in the 1976 case *Imbler v. Pachtman* yet some of the Justices that have looked at this as an original matter have tended to be "quite reluctant in recognizing absolute immunity because it lacks support in the text."

Justice Breyer stated:

"a prosecutor would be liable for investigatory acts until he found uncontrived probable cause to proceed with a trial."

Charbel was unable to discover "uncontrived probable cause to proceed with a trial" due the complete lack of substantiation for any charges, in the IRS letter matter, as Charbel's perjurous statements were wholly without merit.

There was no trial, only an investigation, Charbel was acting as an "investigator" and therefore did not have "absolute immunity". Charbel has never claimed "qualified immunity" only "absolute immunity" and therefore cannot use "qualified immunity" which she acquiesced to the loss of by failing to claim such. Even if Charbel did claim qualified immunity it would not apply in the matter discussed, as qualified immunity does not reach to an agent's criminal acts such as perjury when said act is committed to a judge in furtherance of and/or to commit another unlawful and heinous act.

Immunity reaches to the person ONLY through the position, AND NEVER to the position through the person. Absolute immunity is granted to a person "prosecuting" and not to a person "investigating." When a person is "investigating", even if that person is also at times a prosecutor, absolute immunity cannot reach them. The crimes committed by Charbel were committed while Charbel was acting as an investigator, and not as a prosecutor, therefore absolute immunity cannot reach to Charbel in this instance.

Qualified immunity does not protect an investigator when the acts committed by the investigator are felonious and lead to heinous acts committed against the victim.

Charbel's numerous felonious acts as an investigator lead to the destruction of Plaintiff's personal life, financial life, loss of Liberty, and other heinous events. In fact, Charbel's crimes caused the alienation of Plaintiff's wife, family and friends, crimes which all tolled together are in some ways worse than murder.

Prosecutors are normally immune from suit for their official actions during a trial, but investigators are not. Accordingly, when a prosecutor is acting as an investigator they do not have "absolute immunity" any more than any other investigator does. Since Charbel's perjury to obtain the warrant was committed during the investigatory phase of the case and not the trial, and Charbel was the sole investigator, Charbel cannot claim absolute immunity.

Qualified immunity does not reach to the criminal act of perjury to secure a warrant under false pretense and therefore Charbel MUST be held liable for her criminal act individually. Immunity was not created for, nor does it reach to, blatant criminal and treasonous acts committed under color of state law. Just as a prosecutor cannot come into court and shoot a defendant she knows is innocent as a means to win the case, a prosecutor cannot use perjury to frame a defendant she knows is innocent to win the case.

The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments stipulate to the people's Right to Due Process of Law. There is no greater deprivation of Due Process for an obviously innocent man than being framed by perjurous statements made under color of state law and color of authority by one of the people paid to protect the man's Right to Due Process. Although

Charbel would apparently claim otherwise, a man does have the constitutionally protected Right to not be framed while being investigated, as being framed by a State agent is the ultimate violation of Due Process of Law.

A cursory examination of a famous investigation during the years 2006 and 2007 will give this court a good example of the lack of "absolute immunity" during the investigatory phase of a case, even if the investigation is being lead by a person that is normally a prosecutor.

In that case DA Nifrong protected a prostitute who falsely charged three innocent men with rape. In this case, prosecutor Charbel is protecting a kidnapper by falsely charging an innocent assault and kidnapping victim with murder.

Duke *Office of News & Communications*:

"On the legal front, in June 2007 a N.C. State Bar disciplinary panel concluded after a trial that DA Nifong had made inflammatory and prejudicial comments about the case, intentionally withheld DNA evidence and lied to court officials. The panel called for his disbarment and Nifong resigned his office."

Similarly, Andrew Thomas, with Charbel concurring, has "made prejudicial comments about the case" to the media, Charbel has assisted and/or concealed the fact Dalton "withheld"/destroyed/lost/not recovered exculpatory evidence, and Charbel on numerous occasions "lied to court officials."

Charbel's criminal acts are very similar to Nifrong's criminal acts and the court decided that Nifrong's criminal acts were not protected by either "absolute' and/or "qualified" immunity.

There is no claim by Charbel in this case that Charbel believed the IRS had confiscated Plaintiff's bond, and therefore it stands as an uncontested fact that Charbel knew there was not even a possibility the IRS had confiscated Plaintiff's bond. Charbel knowingly, willingly, and with malice aforethought committed perjury to have Plaintiff falsely imprisoned. Charbel's crime rises to the levels of both kidnapping and treason and there is no immunity for either crime.

PRECEDENTS AS THEY APPLY

In Pottawattamie County v. McGhee, McGhee and Harrington were falsely convicted for murder on witness testimony fabricated by a prosecutor. After their release, McGhee and Harrington sued the prosecutors and the county officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court ruled that the prosecutors could be held liable for violating McGhee and Harrington's substantive due process rights, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed that conclusion.

In their brief on the merits, the prosecutors characterize the substantive due process claim raised by McGhee and Harrington as a "right not to be framed" – a right, they emphasize, that the Court has never recognized. In their view, any violation of a constitutional right requires a deprivation of liberty, not merely an intent to deprive someone of liberty. Therefore, a prosecutor's fabrication of testimony cannot violate the Constitution until the perjury is presented at trial and is instrumental in securing a conviction.

Yet in the issue being discussed, Plaintiff was deprived of liberty due to Charbel's felonious act of perjury.

Our courts and our government have become so corrupt that it is now acceptable for prosecutors to frame innocent people, but at least our courts are not so corrupt as to allow investigators to frame innocent people. Accordingly, when a prosecutor acts as an investigator, the prosecutor is personally liable for framing an innocent person.

In 1976, the Supreme Court held in Imbler v. Pachtman that prosecutors have absolute immunity from liability for their official actions during trial but no such immunity reaches to the investigators.

Plaintiff does not claim Charbel caused him to be convicted by her perjury. Plaintiff ONLY claimed Charbel's perjury to Judge Baca caused Plaintiff to be falsely arrested and falsely imprisoned. The false arrest and false imprisonment did not stem from effects of a conviction and/or trial, but only stem from perjury committed during the "investigatory" process which is not protected under absolute immunity.

Represented at the merits stage by former Solicitor General Paul Clement, respondents McGhee and Harrington reiterate – as they did in their brief in opposition – that the fabrication of perjured testimony against them violated their substantive due process rights to a fair trial. On their interpretation, prosecutorial misconduct that is "so ill-motivated as to shock the conscience" violates substantive due process whenever it occurs. In this case, the prosecutors' intent to use the perjured testimony at trial, regardless whether they ever presented it, demonstrates that they were in fact "ill-motivated."

McGhee and Harrington dispute the prosecutors' contention that Imbler immunity extends to pre-trial investigation and preparation. Allowing immunity for trial acts to "wash back" to absolve prior wrongdoing would, they contend, encourage malicious prosecutors to use falsified evidence in court to shield themselves from suit for its procurement. They criticize the inconsistencies that would result from the prosecutors' construction of the "functional test," pursuant to which police officers – but not prosecutors – could be held liable for falsifying evidence during an investigation. Immunity should attach to types of conduct, they posit, rather than to particular officeholders.

Like the prosecutors, McGhee and Harrington argue that Buckley is significant, but for a different reason: although the Court in Buckley held that prosecutors have "absolute immunity" for conduct that "occurs in the course of [the prosecutor's] role as an advocate for the State," it also made clear that prosecutors have only "qualified immunity" for certain investigative acts. Contrary to what the prosecutors contend, however, procuring testimony is not conduct that occurs in the course of the prosecutor's role as advocate.

The Eighth Circuit held, the prosecutors' procurement of false testimony violated respondents' right to substantive due process; moreover, prosecutors were not entitled to immunity for that violation "where the prosecutor was accused of both fabricating evidence and then using the fabricated evidence at trial."

Eighth Circuit properly applied the functional approach in determining whether petitioners were entitled to immunity: "Absolute immunity does not apply to prosecutors' actions taken outside the advocatory functions."

Respondent McGhee added that relief should be available under Section 1983 in cases such as this one to deter prosecutorial misconduct: otherwise, "[p]rosecutors would be free to fabricate evidence during criminal investigations because they would know there was virtually no possibility of ever being punished for it."

If prosecutors are allowed to make perjurous statements to judges to have innocent people fraudulently arrested and falsely imprisoned absent any accountability then we as a country have in essence converted our system of justice into the *de facto* administration department for the largest concentration camp system since the fall of Nazi Germany.

Criminal acts committed by State agents under color of law and/or color of authority by State agents are NOT protected by "immunity" and therefore the acts committed by Defendants that are criminal in nature are still crimes. Immunity does NOT apply to criminal acts even if the criminal acts where performed by State agents during their regular course of business, in Arizona.

In fact, the concept of "under color of state law" requires that the person committing the criminal acts do so under the guise of their authority and/or position as a state agent and that the act was committed as part of their job.

Color of law: Black's Law Sixth Edition:

The appearance or semblance, without the substance, of legal right. Misuse of power, possesses by virtue of state law and made possible only because wrongdoer is clothed with authority of state, is action taken under "color of state law." Atkins v. Lanning, D.C.Okl., 415 F.Supp. 186, 188

When used in the context of federal civil rights statutes or criminal law, the term is synonymous with the concept of "state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment, Timson v. Weiner, D.C.ohio, 395 F.Supp. 1344, 1347; and means pretense of law and includes actions of officers who undertake to perform their official duties. Thompson v. Baker, D.C.Ark., 133 F. Supp. 247; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.

Action taken by private individuals may be "under color of state law" for purposes of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 governing deprivation of civil rights when significant state involvement attaches to action. Wagner v. Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority, C.A.Tenn., 772 F.2d 227, 229.

Acts "under color of any law" of a State include not only acts done by State officials within the bounds or limits of their lawful authority, but also acts done without and beyond the bounds of their lawful authority; provided that, in order for unlawful acts of an official to be done while such official is purporting or pretending to act in the performance of his official duties: that is to say, the unlawful acts must consist in an abuse or misuse of power which is possessed by the official only because he is an official; and the unlawful acts must be of such a nature or character, and be committed under such circumstances, that they would not have occurred but for the fact that the person committing them was an official then and there exercising his official powers outside the bounds of lawful authority. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.

ARIZONA LAW:

Perjury is not now, and never has been, protected by immunity;

False imprisonment is not now, and never has been, protected by immunity;

Destruction of evidence is not now, and never has been, protected by immunity;

Kidnapping is not now, and never has been, protected by immunity;

Malicious prosecution is not now, and never has been, protected by immunity;

Torture is not now, and never has been, protected by immunity;

Treason against the constitution is not now, and never has been, protected by immunity.

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CLAIMS:

Plaintiff did state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In the interest of expediency, Plaintiff will restate His claim and the relief that can be granted, for clarity so as to not confuse Defendant(s).

Paragraphs 14 through 199 in the original Complaint state claims upon which relief can be granted and Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference all the allegations and/or claims and/or statements, etc., made in the Complaint as though each allegation/claim/statement, etc., is fully set forth herein.

Especially the following claim for which there is no controversy, this statement does NOT represent that Defendant has controversy with the other claims and is stated only to prove the obviousness of Defendants' ability to conceal and "get away with heinous crimes",

Prosecutor Charbel, "under color of *state* law" and/or "under color of authority" committed perjury on or about February 13, 2008, to Judge Baca to have a warrant issued against Plaintiff and caused Plaintiff to be "fraudulently arrested" and "falsely imprisoned".

Plaintiff was harmed greatly by Charbel's criminal acts. Plaintiff's losses include, without limitations, alienation of affection from His wife, His children, His friends, loss of real property, loss of personal property, destruction of financial stability, financial loss of \$2,000,000, loss of future earning ability, loss of Liberty, deprivation of Rights, physical pain by torture while in jail, starvation, asphyxiation by deprivation of oxygen and "gassing" while in custody, and other heinous experiences.

Charbel "claimed" the Internal Revenue Service "confiscated" Plaintiff's bond according to a letter sent to Charbel by the Internal Revenue Service. Said letter made no such claim and in fact did not even allude to the confiscation of Plaintiff's bond.

A cursory inspection of the IRS letter in question will prove Charbel has no defense for her criminal acts in said matter, as also evidenced by the charged being dismissed at the first hearing concerning the false charges.

In direct response to Defendant's

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITES

FACTS:

A. ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY:

Plaintiff has incontrovertibly proven His allegations of Charbel's violations of Plaintiff's Civil Rights as evidenced by the court's own record.

- (1) Charbel is required to "seek justice, not conviction" which the grand jury transcripts prove she violated;
 - (2) A kidnapper, by law, is not a victim;
- (3) Charbel is now claiming the kidnapper (Ms. Beasley) is a kidnapping victim of a man who never left His vehicle even while the kidnapper (Mr. Beasley) was strangling Him;
- (4) Again, the kidnapper (Ms. Beasley) is not a kidnapper victim, but an active participant in the kidnapping event, as the witness testimony shows;
 - (5) Charbel twice refused to allow Plaintiff to appear before the grand juries;
 - (6) Charbel's own contradictory statements evidence her false reporting;

- (7) The court's own record evidences several violations by Charbel of the Rules of evidence:
- (8) The court did decide the warrant issued due to Charbel's perjurous statements was invalid;
- (9) The court's record evidences numerous violations of Arizona criminal procedures by Charbel;
- (10) Charbel not only ignored several witness statements, she attempted to coerce at least one witness into changing her testimony;
- (11) Plaintiff's allegation is incontrovertible and as evidence of such the court only need know that Charbel has concealed the interview of said witness from the defense;
 - (12) Charbel's perjurous statements are evidenced by the court's record.

LAW AND ANALYSIS:

Issue:

Charbel is not protected from suits for damages by the doctrine of absolute immunity because Charbel was acting outside of the scope of her duties as a prosecutor. It must therefore be Charbel's claim that prosecutor's duties include, without limitations, treason, perjury, obstruction of justice, wrongful imprisonment, destruction of evidence, etc.

The evidence and record of the court makes it patently clear Charbel has violated numerous laws and deprived Plaintiff of His Civil Rights under color of state law and color of authority and Charbel has not presented ANY evidence to the contrary.

In fact, Charbel has not denied any allegation and has therefore acquiesced to Plaintiff's allegations and thus has agreed with all of Plaintiff's allegations.

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Charbel's confession and avoidance is prima facie evidence of Charbel's admittance to the crimes as listed by Plaintiff.

Charbel's references for absolute immunity ONLY apply when the prosecutor is acting in accordance with state and federal law. The precedents used are not appropriate in this case as Charbel was knowingly committing felonies under color of state law and color of authority.

Charbel's claim that immunity applies to the interview of witnesses may stand for the interview, but has no bases in fact or law for Charbel's coercion of the witness and/or use of benefits and/or threats to cause the witness to commit unlawful acts against another witness as a form of "coercion by proxy" which is truly more of an act of treason and terrorism as defined by federal law. The fact Charbel purposely, and with malice aforethought, concealed the "interview" is prima facie evidence of Charbel's intent to commit a terrorist act against a civilian in furtherance of treason. This court should note that Charbel has still not informed nor admitted to the interview and has evaded any and all questions concerning said interview. Immunity may ONLY, and not always, apply post-indictment and NEVER during the investigation.

A prosecutor is free to investigate or not investigate, but a prosecutor choosing to investigate is an investigator AND NOT a prosecutor while investigating. Although there is no law to punish a corrupt prosecutor that refuses to investigate a crime in order to protect someone she knows has committed a heinous crime, the prosecutor CANNOT use her purposeful failure to prosecute as grounds to grant the known criminal "victim" status to protect the criminal. The granting of victim status is a further act of treason as Charbel

is using a constitutional amendment to protect a criminal that may be prosecuted under state, federal AND International Law.

United States Constitution Article III Section 3; and Arizona Constitution Article II Section 28:

Treason against the United States [state], shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, **giving them Aid and Comfort**. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.

Charbel's treason also includes, without limitations, her act of using Article II Section 2.1 to protect a kidnapper and preventing the victim of the assault and kidnapping (Plaintiff in this matter) from access to Article II section 2.1 protection.

It is now to late for Charbel to deny her criminal acts as her claim of "absolute immunity" cannot stand and therefore her admittance to the acts by her *tacit acquiescence* and *confession and avoidance* to the allegations is all this court need for this court to grant Plaintiff summary judgment.

Charbel list of precedents includes words such as "properly fulfill his function in the judicial process," "post-conviction" and "use of perjured testimony." Accordingly the precedents do not apply to this instant case: as Charbel did not "properly fulfill her function in the judicial process" as it is not possible to properly commit perjury; and there was no conviction in the matter concerning the IRS letter and in fact the case was dismissed and the charge thrown out; and Charbel did not "use perjured testimony", Charbel gave perjured testimony.

A prosecutor may be immune from criminal acts during a trial, such a concept is so abhorrent to society there is no way to explain how disgusting said immunity is to any

man with a conscience, but a prosecutor has absolutely no immunity for treason and/or perjury to a judge to fraudulently start a trial.

Charbel is simply trying to obfuscate the law and the facts to hide her numerous criminal acts that are not protected by any facet of law, ethics, morality, or decency. She is simply behaving as a heinous and evil criminal, and praying to the devil that somehow the court be as corrupt as she is and hoping her corrupt affiliations and employment force this court to unlawfully protect her.

The office of public prosecutor should be administered with independence and courage AND justice. No prosecutor is free to commit crimes to unlawfully convict innocent people. Years ago the public stopped trusting the prosecutor's office, due to the criminal acts by people like Charbel. The only way for the prosecutor's office to regain the public's trust is for the court to punish prosecutors like Charbel and removing them from any office of power and any dealings with the Courts.

In conclusion, all of Plaintiff's allegations of wrong doing by Charbel are proven by the court's own record and have been agreed to by Charbel's tacit acquiescence and confession and avoidance to Plaintiff's allegation. Therefore, summary judgment should be granted in the Plaintiff's favor.

Elements

Generally speaking, there are three elements required to bring an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The plaintiff must prove the following:

1) Plaintiff was deprived of a specific right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States;

- 2) The alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law; and
- 3) The deprivation was the proximate cause of injuries suffered by the plaintiff.

 Each element was met in the matter before the court by Charbel.
- 1. Plaintiff was obviously deprived of His Rights to Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness as neither exists in jail nor being tethered to a GPS with curfews and travel restrictions:
- 2. Plaintiff was also deprived of the following constitutionally protected Rights and/or freedoms: Due Process; Speedy Trial; worship; religion; speech; redress of grievance; assembly; to be secure in His person, houses, papers and effects; be informed of the nature and cause of cause of the accusation; confront the witness against Him; not have property taken without just compensation; excessive bail not be imposed; cruel and unusual punishment not be inflicted; not be enslaved or forced into involuntary servitude; equal protection under the law; and others; Due to jail, GPS, fraudulent persecution, and etc.

There is no time limit and/or requirement enumerated in the Bill of Rights and/or the United States Code for the loss of Rights and/or Freedoms to apply, only that one be unlawfully deprived of said Rights and/or Freedoms for one to have cause for action against the agent/actor that causes the loss.

Albeit that a single day and a single night in jail may not cause one's life to end, when such a blatant act committed by a rogue agent under color of state law is so obviously unrighteous and unfounded every person familiar with the act becomes too scared to assist the victim. Charbel's false arrest of Plaintiff was so obviously heinous and

unfounded that one of the most respected attorneys of one of the most prestigious law firms in the State decided there was no way the court was even attempting to achieve justice in this matter and withdrew from the case.

Charbel's tactics come straight from any tyrant's strategy of court room tactics.

Basically, she violates Rights and Laws so blatantly obviously that anyone would know she is capable of harming them to reach her unholy goals.

The fact Charbel could have ONLY committed her criminal acts under color of state law and color of authority are without controversy as no one but a prosecutor could have so blatantly lied to a judge to falsely obtain a warrant and not been immediately arrested.

3. The false arrest of Plaintiff caused great financial harm to Plaintiff; destroyed His reputation; scared His wife into leaving Him; caused two of His Children to alienate Him; caused His private counsel to withdraw as they could not find any way to win a case when the prosecutor was so obviously willing to violate the law to falsely arrest a man so obviously innocent of a false allegation; and eventually led to Plaintiff's complete financial loss and destruction.

SUMMARY OF CASE AGAINST CHARBEL

A government official is entitled to immunity unless his "act is so obviously wrong, in the light of preexisting law, that only a plainly incompetent officer or one who was knowingly violating the law would have done such a thing."

See all of the following: Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Trustees, 28 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 1994)(en banc). Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817; Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1149.

Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1149;

Ensley v. Soper, 142 F.3d 1402, 1406 (11th Cir. 1998)

Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998);

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987);

Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).

Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991).

Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d 1339, 1345 (11th Cir. 1991).

Knowingly committing perjury to a judge to have a man that one knows by the witness statements is innocent falsely arrested and wrongfully imprisoned is as "obviously

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wrong" as any one person can possibly be.

As the court is aware, claiming immunity is an affirmative defense, and as such requires the one attempting to cloth themselves in the immunity to admit to the commission of the alleged act. Charbel's attempt to fraudulently claim "absolute immunity" is also Charbel's voluntary confession to the alleged crimes. Charbel cannot now go back and recant her confession. Thus, Charbel has confessed to the Plaintiff's allegations and yet Charbel does not meet the requisite standard for immunity.

In accordance with Charbel's voluntary confession there is no controversy as to whether Charbel is guilty of the crimes as alleged by Plaintiff, her own fraudulent defenses have thus convicted her. At issue then, and the only issue left, is whether Charbel's fraudulent claim to "absolute immunity" may stand. The court then must decide whether it should throw out the *doctrine of stare decisis* to protect the criminal just as Charbel threw out the Plaintiff's Civil Rights to protect the kidnappers. Charbel's reasoning that she was required to protect the kidnappers at the cost of an innocent man's Civil Rights, Due Process Rights, and Liberty because kidnapper Mr. Beasley had financial ties to her boss,

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Maricopa County Attorney Andrew Thomas, do not rise to the level of "in the public interest" anymore than this court protecting Charbel because she is a prosecutor, does.

Charbel has no grounds and no basis to claim "absolute immunity" in the investigation of a crime pursuant to numerous SCOTUS decisions and precedents, her unfounded claim to "absolute immunity" is invalid. Since Charbel has not claimed "qualified immunity", nor has she denied the allegations, she has thus **voluntarily confessed** to numerous felonies and has relinquished any protection of immunity for her confessed crimes.

Accordingly, the court has no choice but to grant summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff against Defendant Charbel, irrespective of any decision concerning the other Defendant(s).

FACTS:

B. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY:

Robert Lyon, D.O. M.E. ('Lyon'') voluntarily forsook his protection of qualified immunity when he chose to not do the required testing of the deceased kidnapper's body.

LAW AND ANALYSIS:

Issue:

1. Lyon is not protected by qualified immunity.

Officials are only entitled to immunity while in performance of their duties, not while in refusing to do their duties. Lyon had a duty to determine the "actual cause of death" which requires FULL knowledge of the mental condition of the deceased kidnapper. Lyon's voluntary refusal to discover evidence of chemicals that would have

affected the deceased kidnapper's mental ability as a means of purposefully interfering with Plaintiff's defense is a waiver of Lyon's privilege of immunity.

Lyon's duty to perform His function as a Medical Examiner to ascertain what caused the deceased kidnapper to act in such a manner as to cause His own death that violates the Plaintiff's Civil Rights as a result of Lyon's dereliction of his duty. Lyon's duties require Him to correctly establish the true cause of death, and NOT to use His Office to hide the true cause of death in furtherance of the prosecutor's malicious prosecution of an innocent man.

When Lyon refused to do his duty he refused to accept the immunity granted for doing his duty.

C. <u>42 U.S.C.A. §1985</u>

Charbel's use of her authority, her office and the people in her office, under color of state law and color of authority to coerce a witness in an attempt to have that witness file false charges against another witness to cause the other witness to change testimony is sufficient to state said claim.

Plaintiff's claims were stated correctly and are obvious and incontrovertible and therefore stand.

D. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985(3)

All elements (1, 2, 3, &4) have been met. The second element was reached when Charbel purposely and knowingly decided to protect a kidnapper due to the kidnapper's connection to the deceased kidnapper who was financially tied to Charbel's superior,

Andrew Thomas, and the actual victim (Plaintiff in this matter) was of a "different class" by not being financially involved with Charbel's superior.

Plaintiff's claim was stated correctly and is obvious and incontrovertible and therefore stands.

E. <u>42 U.S.C.A. §1986</u>

Plaintiff's claims were stated correctly and are obvious and incontrovertible and therefore stand.

F. <u>RULE 12(b)6</u>

Plaintiff's claims were stated correctly and are obvious and incontrovertible and therefore stand.

Plaintiff alleged facts (1) committed by a person and persons acting under color of state law and (2) the conduct deprived Plaintiff of federal constitutional rights. Plaintiff did state the affirmative link between the alleged injury and Defendants conduct. Plaintiff has provided factual proof, which Defendant's Charbel and Lyon have not rebutted and ONLY attempted to unlawfully invoke immunity for their actions. Such invocation of immunity absent rebuttal of the allegations is Defendant's *tacit acquiescence* and *confession and avoidance* to the allegations and is therefore Defendant's voluntary admittance and/or confession to the crimes stated in Plaintiff's allegations.

Plaintiff's allegations are not naked and are evidenced by Defendant's own statements and the record of Superior Court case number CR2008-106594.

Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts supporting his claims that Charbel and Lyon violated His constitutional and civil rights. Plaintiff's compliant contains more than

enough factual allegations. In fact, the court's record evidences enough crimes committed by Defendants to have Defendants charged criminally and prosecuted, if the court actually ever prosecuted Maricopa County government agents when they were caught committing crimes. Maricopa County has a long public history of government agent's crimes being ignored.

SCOTUS decisions require the court to inform a *pro se/pro per* of deficiencies in pleadings and give the pro se/pro per the opportunity to cure those deficiencies before the court makes a determination in accordance with the pleadings. Defendants' disagreement with SCOTUS is expected but has no standing in this court. Plaintiff moves this court to not only draw on the court's experience and common sense, but also Rectum Rogare, and do what is right as God is watching and will judge accordingly.

If Defendant is unhappy with the length of Plaintiff's pleadings, Defendant should attempt to commit fewer crimes in the future as the pleadings are contingent upon the number of Defendant's criminal acts. Plaintiff's claim was stated correctly and is obvious and incontrovertible and therefore stands.

G. STATE TORT CLAIMS

Plaintiff attempted to notice Defendants of claims but was prevented by Defendant. Defendant has used color of state late law and color of authority to prohibit Plaintiff from any and all actions. Defendants continually conspire to threaten and intimidate Plaintiff by using Defendants' authority unlawfully. Defendant has proven time and time again that Defendant will falsely arrest and wrongfully imprison Plaintiff to prevent Plaintiff from invoking His Rights.

No time limits apply in this matter as Defendants' numerous crimes to prevent

Plaintiff from proper access to the court is Defendants' voluntary waiving of time limits.

Plaintiff can only now state a claim upon which relief can be granted because

Plaintiff is no longer scared of Defendants. Defendants have committed so many crimes

against Plaintiff and so heinously destroyed Plaintiff's life to the point Plaintiff no longer

cares if Defendants conspiracy rises to the level of Defendants murdering Him.

Accordingly, Plaintiff hereby states for the record, even after being informed by one of Andrew Thomas' "mobbed up" associates that if Plaintiff informs the court of this fact Andrew Thomas will order Plaintiff murdered.

A person unknown to Plaintiff appeared at Plaintiff's home and informed Plaintiff of the following:

Mr. Beasley [deceased kidnapper] was an accountant that "laundered" money through stock trades for the "mob", [criminal syndicate] that brought Andrew Thomas to power and Andrew Thomas could not prosecute Mrs. Beasley [surviving kidnapper] for her crimes and the crimes of her husband as she could use the knowledge of her husband's "connections" to intimidate Andrew Thomas. Andrew Thomas was going to do what ever it took to put Plaintiff in prison to hide Thomas' connection to said "mob." If Plaintiff ever revealed this information to anyone, Thomas would order Plaintiff's execution, and due to Thomas' position, Thomas would definitely get away with it. The person that informed Plaintiff of this, claimed this was Plaintiff's one and only warning. Said person claimed a "working relationship" with said "mob."

Said person explained that Thomas used Mr. Beasley as an accountant that is familiar with stock trades to somehow profit from the "sale of prisoners through bonds" to increase Thomas' and Thomas' "friends" wealth, and that any investigation into Mr. Beasley might show that Thomas was using His Office to prosecute everyone he could, irrespective of people's innocence, to put as many people in prison as possible so he could somehow trade more bonds. This person claimed the investigation may lead to evidence discoverable in Arizona's Comprehensive Annual Financial Report to the federal government.

Plaintiff kept this information secret for almost two years out of fear for His safety and the safety of His family. Plaintiff's family has abandoned Him because of the constant persecution He is suffering at the hands of these criminal conspirators and in essence has not enough left to lose to feel enough fear from death to put up with the false and malicious prosecution.

Plaintiff is thus hereby informing this court if any harm comes to Plaintiff said harm is directly or indirectly caused by an order from Andrew Thomas and Judge McMurdie, Prosecutor Charbel, Detective Dalton, Detective Shearer and others would therefore be accessories to the murder of Plaintiff.

Plaintiff's Life and Liberty are in immediate peril and Plaintiff should be in fear for His life, yet Plaintiff does not have enough of His life left to fear death due to the numerous criminal acts committed against Plaintiff by Defendants.

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SUMMARY

WHEREAS, Plaintiff's claims were stated correctly, are obvious and incontrovertible and therefore stand.

WHEREAS, Defendants have not rebutted Plaintiff's claims and therefore Defendants have voluntarily confessed that all of Plaintiff's claims are correct and Defendants are in agreement with Plaintiff's claims.

WHEREAS, Defendants' claims to immunity cannot stand pursuant to and in accordance with law, precedent, *stare decisis*, and numerous SCOTUS decisions.

WHEREAS, Defendants have voluntarily, willfully, and the requisite knowledge, have forsaken and waived their Rights to argue against Plaintiff's claims in Defendants' basely claim of immunity.

WHEREAS, Time restrictions against Plaintiff are and were nullified by

Defendants' unlawful acts of using their authority under color of law and color of
authority to prohibit Plaintiff from pursing any remedy for the harm caused to Plaintiff by

Defendants' crimes.

WHEREAS, In the case of any imprisonment of Plaintiff and/or the death of Plaintiff and/or the "disappearance" of Plaintiff the court may ONLY presume that such incident was done at the bequest of Andrew Thomas in furtherance of Thomas' desire to conceal Thomas' association with a criminal syndicate, and with the assistance of Defendants.

WHEREAS, ALL elements of the statutes listed in the Complaint have been met at least once in Plaintiff's pleading.

WHEREAS. The state agents have committed so many crimes against Plaintiff this 2 court can only conclude there is no limit to Defendants' quest to falsely convict and/or 3 murder Plaintiff in their attempt to "silence" Plaintiff to conceal Defendants' crimes. 4 **THEREFORE,** Plaintiff moves the court in the interest of justice to grant summary 5 6 judgment in favor of Plaintiff; and to order Defendants to cease and desist their unlawful 7 persecution by malicious prosecution of Plaintiff; and to not kidnap and/or murder 8 Plaintiff. 9 10 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: This day of February, in the year, our Lord, 2010. 11 12 BY:[John C. Stuart, *sui juris*, Authorized Representative, 13 Tertius interveniens, rectus in curia, for: JOHN STUART, ens legis, in propria persona 14 15 <u>COPYRIGHT NOTICE:</u> The above-mentioned entity is quoting citations 'as 16 purported in' context to copyrighted case law, statutes, rules of court and court decision material as found in books published with Federal or state funding 17 supplied by the Citizens of the united States of America and intended for use by 18 attorneys, and does so under the provisions of the Fair use clause of the copyright laws of the United States. 19 <u>In accordance with Rodrigues v Ray Donavan</u> (U.S. Department of Labor), 769 F. 2d 1344, 1348 (1985) "All codes, rules and regulations are applicable to the 20 government authorities only, not human/Creators in accordance with God's laws. 21 All codes, rules and regulations are unconstitutional and lacking in due process ..." Plaintiff hereby defines for this document and in perpetuity the term "himself" 22 when used speaking of the Plaintiff means the ens legis, a trust, and a separate 23 entity from grantor of said trust, as John Stuart is a God created man, a natural being, and JOHN STUART is government created fiction, ens legis, one is separate 24 from the other. Any and all uses of the separate entities as being interchangeable

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and/or the same entity is either accidental and/or Plaintiff's, a "laymen", attempt at not confusing the Court and/or defendants and does not abrogate the fact that the

two entities are different and separate, and said separation shall remain inviolate for this document, and in perpetuity, such has not and shall never be abrogated.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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3	COPY of the foregoing delivered/mailed this day of February 2010 to:
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5	Honorable Roslyn O. Silver
6	United States District Court Sandra Day O'Connor U.S. Courthouse
7	401 West Washington Street, Suite 624, SPC 59
8	Phoenix, Arizona 85003
9	COPY of the foregoing delivered/mailed this day of February 2010 to: Prosecutor Susie Charbel Maricopa County Attorney 301 W. Jefferson, 8th Floor Phoenix, AZ 85003-2243
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15	CODY 6:1 6 : 11: 1/ :1 1
16	this day of February 2010 to:
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18	Medial Examiner Robert E. Lyon, DO Maricopa County Forensic Science Center
19	701 West Jefferson Phoenix, Arizona 85007
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23	By: [], agent
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