Moscow's strategy rests on three pillars.

The first is the cultivation of relationships with African leaders, particularly those attempting to remain in power in spite of constitutional limitations — such as, for instance, Sudan's former dictator, Omar al-Bashir, who was recently ousted by oppositionists. The Kremlin dispatched several hundred paramilitary advisers in late 2018 to train the Sudanese military how to suppress protests.

Ultimately, Moscow's mission to boost al-Bashir failed; he was overthrown in April 2019, a few months later.

The second pillar is the insertion of Russian agents into the inner circle of rising African leaders, such as the young, recently elected president of Madagascar, Andry Rajoelina. This pillar is also likely at work in the Kremlin's penetration of Central African Republic (CAR) President Faustin Touadera's staff by the Russian security adviser, Valery Zakharov.

The third pillar involves arms sales: Moscow is the largest supplier of weapons to African countries. Russia, for instance, has been shipping arms to the weak administration of the CAR, which is trying to maintain a shaky truce between two ethnic groups that are responsible for considerable civil strife in recent years. The Kremlin has also inked arms deals with Nigeria and Sudan -- apparently hoping to develop long-term military relationships on the African continent as it has done with Algeria and Egypt.