The news bothered Israel, which a few days before the announcement had signaled its concern about ties between Moscow and Tehran. In an effort to calm the mood, Russian Ambassador to Israel Alexander Shein noted, "On the whole, the role of Russia in Syria is accepted by our Israeli colleagues with understanding. The only reservation they have is for them it would be best if there were US-Russian rather than Iranian-Russian cooperation in surmounting the Syrian crisis and fighting terrorism in the Middle East." He said that Israel drew its own red lines, which is the transfer of modern weapons to Hezbollah and the "creation of an anti-Israel platform in the Golan Heights that would involve both the group and Iran."

Maneuvering between Iran and Israel is not an ordeal. Political and military contacts between Russia and Israel are on the rise. Trying to make sense of what drives Israel's major foreign policy imperatives and how they are shaped is getting even more important for Moscow.

First it should be said that Israelis consider their state to be in rather good shape both politically and economically. That assumption has certainly some solid ground: The country's gross domestic product is growing, the high-tech industry is blooming, the political system is stable, Iran is not posing a direct threat to the security of the country and the Syrian army, as well as Hezbollah fighters, are preoccupied with the civil war in Syria. That does not mean Israel as a state is relaxed, because both domestic and external challenges are serious and have to be dealt with urgently and at the same time wisely.