In a damning commentary on the rush to invade Iraq, Sir John Chilcot's inquiry found "diplomatic options had not" at the time "been exhausted. Military action was therefore not a last resort" — as then Prime Minister Tony Blair led the people of the U.K. to believe.

While the Chilcot Report proffers scathing insight into the circumstances surrounding the U.K.'s part in one of the most contentious invasions of a sovereign state in modern times, findings dually skewer then U.S. President George W. Bush's reckless rush to force military action.

"Military action might have been necessary later," the BBC summarized several key points found by the Inquiry, "but in March 2003: There was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein; The strategy of containment could have been adapted and continued for some time; The majority of the Security Council supported continuing UN inspections and monitoring.

"Judgments about the severity of the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction — known as WMD — were presented with a certainty that was not justified" and "Intelligence had 'not established beyond doubt' that Saddam Hussein had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons."

Comprehensive in scope at 2.6 million words, the report covers the U.K.'s role in Iraq from 2001 to 2009, and includes preparations for the invasion, troop preparedness, the actual conflict, and the lack of forethought of the consequences — both in civilian and other casualties, as well as other repercussions — aggression would have on the country and region.

Chilcot investigated the nuanced codependent relationship between the U.S. and U.K. under the leadership of Bush and Blair, paraphrased by the BBC, "former prime minister Tony Blair overestimated his ability to influence US decisions on Iraq; and the UK's relationship with the US does not require unconditional support."

Though many expected the seven-year investigation to 'whitewash' widely-known mistakes in intelligence and support for the U.S. goal of "regime change," Chilcot did not hesitate to keenly criticize the unjustified and heightened rush to initiate an all-out military assault — despite the report's somewhat subdued language in doing so.

Nor does the report let either government off the hook for the enormity of the tragedy — in the civilian death toll, lack of planning for the aftermath in Iraq, nor in Blair's capitulation to Bush's bellicosity, despite lack of sufficient justification for war. Indeed, "despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion were underestimated," as the report's Executive Summary states.