IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF ARIZONA

                         Case No.:
JOHN STUART, Victim,
                                        Petitioner
vs.

PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT
HOMICIDE DETECTIVE PAUL DALTON,
PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT
CSS DETECTIVE BRYAN KORUS,
MARICOPA COUNTY MEDICAL
EXAMINER’S OFFICE
M.E. DR. ROBERT LYONS,
JOHN DOES 1-100, Perpetrators / Scienters
                                         Respondents
________________________________________/

        PETITION FOR WRIT OF QUO WARRANTO
              AND PETITION FOR RELIEF
        PURSUANT TO THE WRITS PROVISION IN
    ARTICLE 6 § 5 ¶ 1 OF THE ARIZONA CONSTITUTION

    John Stuart, Victim, Petitioner, a civilian and a layman in Arizona, seeks an Order directed to the Maricopa County Superior Court (the “Court”), the Phoenix Police Department, the Maricopa County Medical Examiner’s Office and the respective Respondents directing the aforementioned government entities to remove from office the relevant Respondent(s) respectively per entity for said Respondent’s acts of “unlawfully … exercises[ing] [the powers of their] public office…;” and directing the Court to dismiss case CR2008-106594-001-001-DT (the “case”). The continued wrongful prosecution of the case and/or John Stuart would violate fundamental precepts of the Anglo-American common law tradition and compromise the integrity of the whole of the Arizona judicial system; integrity is essential to the judiciary's fulfillment of its role in our democracy and the requirement of Due Process of Law.
    A cursory examination of Maricopa County Superior Court case State vs. Stuart CR2008-1056594-001 DT would convince every reasonable person that John Stuart is being framed by dirty cops and a corrupt prosecutor through their wanton criminal and purposeful; i) destruction of collected exculpatory evidence; and ii) intimidation of defense witnesses; and iii) the commission of perjury; and iv) other criminal, unethical and egregious acts to deprive John Stuart of his substantive right to a fair trial and deny him Due Process of Law under color of state law.
    An in depth study of the criminal and unethical acts committed by the police officers, the county prosecutor and even a few judges in said case would prove conclusively said agents have committed over 100 felonies; and violated the Rules of Court over 100 times; and destroyed all 13 pieces of exculpatory evidence in their care, custody and possession that would have established factually John Stuart is innocent and/or justified pursuant to Arizona law for any act that may have led to the death of the drunken and drugged maniac that attempted to murder John Stuart and his then fiancé inside of John Stuart’s vehicle after the maniac had successfully kidnapped them during Kidnapper’s alcohol and illicit drug induced rage. 
    The first trial, done pro se by John Stuart, led to a mis-trial due to the numerous and repetitive purposeful acts of invited error and obvious subordination of perjury committed by the prosecutor.
    The charges themselves are fraudulent and only obtained due to numerous acts of perjury committed by the lead detective and suborned by the prosecutor to two Grand Juries.
    The case in question violates almost every concept of Due Process of Law; has deprived John Stuart of several of his substantive rights; and contradicts the decisions and mandates of the most important cases in American jurisprudence – especially Brady, Giglio, Miranda, Terry, Basurto, Marbury and literally hundreds if not thousands of others.
    It is an undeniable fact that John Stuart cannot receive a fair trial in Maricopa County Arizona since John Stuart was a primary witness in the federal ‘prisoner torture’ case against Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio (“Arpaio”). Arpaio’s known history of forcing judges and others through intimidation into prosecuting and/or persecuting anyone that stands against him is more than good and sufficient cause to change the venue of the case to outside of Arpaio’s reach of intimidation. Yet every attempt by John Stuart to change the venue has been unlawfully denied sua sponte.
    John Stuart, pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) §§ 12- 2041, et seq; and his substantive rights; and Article II § 4 of the state constitution, and all matters of Due Process of Law; petitions this honorable Court to issue a Writ of Quo Warranto against Dalton; Korus; and Lyons; and any and all other known/unknown parties that may be involved in any way with the relevant acts, hereinafter “John Does 1-100”; hereinafter collectively “Perpetrators” and/or “Scienters.” All named parties had the requisite knowledge their acts were unlawful for this Court to consider them scienters in all aspects of said crimes and/or unethical acts.
    John Stuart respectfully moves this honorable Court to intervene in this matter forthwith and prevent further travesties of justice and in the interest of justice; and rule on all matters relevant in accordance with Arizona law and the allegations stated and unrebutted herein.
    John Stuart respectfully informs this honorable Court that time is of the essence since state agents and/or their co-conspirator(s) have already destroyed 13 pieces of exculpatory evidence; and have intimidated at least 2 defense witnesses into being too scared to testify; and have falsely arrested and wrongfully imprisoned John Stuart on at least 2 occasions.
    The complete record of the case and trial; the police reports; all evidence; and the like and that of all other related cases and/or charges against any and all parties involved in any way are hereby submitted as if fully set forth herein.
    John Stuart’s Motion is based upon the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities. 

        DATED this 18th day of October, 2012.   

        With all rights,   
                    By: _______________, without prejudice
                                    John C. Stuart, sui juris
       MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I                        JURISDICTION
1.    The Arizona Supreme Court is the Court of Original Jurisdiction for Quo Warrantos pursuant to, inter alia, Art. 6 § 5 ¶ 1 of the Constitution of Arizona.
2.    John Stuart, Plaintiff, is a pro se litigant and therefore shall be held to less stricter standard than a ‘licensed’ attorney.
3.    The Arizona Attorney General has the right and duty pursuant to, inter alia, A.R.S. § 12-2041 to bring a Quo Warranto action to the Supreme Court and/or the superior court “…against any person who … unlawfully … exercises any public office …. within this state…”; and “…The attorney general shall bring the action when he has reason to believe that any such office … is being … unlawfully ….exercised.”    
5.    The Maricopa County Attorney has the right and duty pursuant to, inter alia, A.R.S. § 12-2042 to bring a Quo Warranto action “…against any person who …exercises any public office … within his county. The county attorney shall bring the action when he has reason to believe that any such office … is being … unlawfully … exercised.”
6.    Every individual has the right and duty pursuant to, inter alia, A.R.S. § 12-2043 to bring a Quo Warranto action “…If the attorney general or the county attorney refuses to bring an action as provided for in sections 12-2041 and 12-2042, upon information or at the request of any person claiming such office or franchise, the person may apply to the court for leave to bring the action in his own name and may so bring it if leave therefor is granted.”
7.    Both the Arizona Attorney General and the Maricopa County Attorney have violated their loyalty oaths of office and unlawfully refused to bring any action for Quo Warranto on behalf of John Stuart; and therefore John Stuart has the substantive right to bring this action to the Arizona Supreme court on his own behalf.
8.    Pursuant to, inter alia, A.R.S. § 12-2045: “If a defendant is adjudged guilty of usurping or intruding into or unlawfully holding an office, franchise or privilege, such defendant is guilty of a petty offense and shall be excluded from the office, franchise or privilege.”
9.    Perpetrators / Scienters have each knowingly, intelligently, willfully and purposefully, separately and/or jointly, violated Arizona law and/or unlawfully refused to do as commanded by a Search Warrant; to purposefully destroy and/or cause the destruction of exculpatory evidence to: falsely arrest, wrongfully imprison and eventually obtain a false conviction of a man they have sufficient evidence to know is innocent and/or justified under Arizona law.
10.    Perpetrators / Scienters acts evidence their knowledge and intent and constitute good and sufficient cause for this honorable Court to proceed in this matter.
THEREFORE; each Perpetrator who “…unlawfully … exercised” duties of his office and pursuant to Arizona law shall be removed from office.
II                      PARTIES
1.    John Stuart (“Stuart”) was Kidnapped, assaulted and almost murdered inside of Stuart’s own personal and private vehicle while Stuart was “performing the political function” of campaigning for a presidential candidate; by Orville Thomas Beasley, III, (“Kidnapper”) on or about January 29, 2008.  Stuart was at all times relevant required by law to protect the occupant(s) of the vehicle he was piloting; had no duty to retreat when attacked by Kidnapper; was justified in any and all acts he may or may not have committed to survive and/or escape the Kidnapping and/or attempted murder of his person and/or the third party occupant of his vehicle - see: A.R.S. §§ 13-418, et seq, and others.
2.    State Attorney General, Tom Horne (“Attorney General”); is required by law to file a Quo Warranto – see: A.R.S. § 12 -2041.
3.    Maricopa County Attorney Bill Montgomery (“County Attorney”); is required by law to file a Quo Warranto – see: A.R.S. § 12 -2042.
4.    Phoenix Police Department Homicide Detective Paul Dalton (“Dalton”), Scienter; is required by law to do as commanded by warrants, including without limitations, collecting evidence commanding be collected and then maintaining and not destroying said collected evidence.
5.    Phoenix Police Department CSS Detective Bryan Korus (“Korus”), Scienter; is prohibited by law from purposefully destroying evidence and/or mis-stating evidence.
6.    Maricopa County Medical Examiner’s Office (“MCMEO”); is required by law to retain hair samples, and also in this instant case the chipped tooth, of a decedent when autopsied – see: A.R.S. § 13-4221.
7.    MCMEO Medical Examiner Dr. Robert Lyons (“Lyons”), Scienter; is required by law to retain hair samples, and also in this instant case the chipped tooth of decedent, when autopsied – see: A.R.S. § 13-4221.
8.    Any and all other unknown parties that may be involved in any way with the relevant acts (“John Does 1-100”) collectively (“Perpetrators”).
9.    Kidnapper with the assistance of his wife; committed Kidnapping - see: A.R.S. § 13-1304, and numerous other felonies and misdemeanors.

III        STATEMENT OF INCONTROVERTABLE FACTS
1.     On or about January 29, 2008, Stuart was performing the “political function” of hanging banners for a presidential candidate by request of said presidential candidate; this fact has been evidenced by the State.
2.    Pursuant to, inter alia, A.R.S. § 13-1304(5) “.. Interfere[ing] with the performance of a … political function; ..” is defined as Kidnapping under Arizona law.
3.    On or about January 29, 2008 at approximately 9pm: Kidnapper - while under the influence of alcohol (.19 B.A.C.) and the illicit drug L.S.D.; followed Stuart for approximately 3 miles, then Kidnapper parked next to Stuart on a public street, then Kidnapper left his vehicle, then Kidnapper entered Stuart’s vehicle and took control of the vehicle and attempted to murder and/or greatly harm Stuart by repeatedly striking and attempting to strangle Stuart and gouging Stuart’s eye, temporarily injuring Stuart’s eye, an organ, and restricting the blood and air flow of Stuart. 
4.    Kidnapper’s violent acts against Stuart are also defined as Kidnapping pursuant to, inter alia, A.R.S. § 13-1304(3, 4, 6) as Kidnapper did in fact: (3) “…inflict physical injury…” and “…aided in the commission of a felony;” and (4) “Place[d] the Stuart or a third person in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury to the Stuart or the third person; and (6) “Seize[d] or exercise[d] control over … vehicle.”
5.    Stuart sustained numerous injuries caused by Kidnapper; including without limitations, strangulation injuries and eye injuries.
6.    Kidnapper attempted to remove Stuart from Stuart’s own personal vehicle through the window opening of said vehicle by Stuart’s neck.
7.    Pursuant to, inter alia, A.R.S. §§ 13-401, et seq, Stuart’s “…has[ve] no duty to retreat before … using …. deadly physical force and A person has no duty to retreat before … using deadly physical force … if the person is in a place where the person may legally be and is not engaged in an unlawful act”; and “…a person is justified in … using … deadly physical force against another person if the person reasonably believes himself or another person to be in imminent peril of death or serious physical injury and the person against whom the … deadly physical force is …. used was in the process of unlawfully or forcefully entering, or had unlawfully or forcefully entered, a … occupied vehicle, or had removed or was attempting to remove another person against the other person's will from the residential structure or occupied vehicle…” and “A person is presumed to reasonably believe that the … use of … deadly force is immediately necessary for the purposes of sections 13-404 through 13-408, section 13-418 and section 13-421 if the person knows or has reason to believe that the person against whom … deadly force is … used is unlawfully or forcefully entering or has unlawfully or forcefully entered and is present in the person's …occupied vehicle.” and “…For the purposes of sections 13-404 through 13-408, section 13-418 and section 13-421, a person who is unlawfully or forcefully entering or who has unlawfully or forcefully entered and is present in a …. occupied vehicle is presumed to pose an imminent threat of unlawful deadly harm to any person who is in the …. occupied vehicle”; and “A person is justified in … using … deadly physical force against another if and to the extent the person reasonably believes that physical force or deadly physical force is immediately necessary to prevent the other's commission of … kidnapping under section 13-1304, manslaughter under section 13-1103, second or first degree murder under section 13-1104 or 13-1105, … or aggravated assault under section 13-1204, subsection A, paragraphs 1 and 2…”; and “A person is presumed to be acting reasonably … the person is acting to prevent what the person reasonably believes is the imminent or actual commission of any of the offenses listed in subsection A of this section…”; and “This section includes the use …deadly physical force in a person's .. conveyance of any kind, or any other place in this state where a person has a right to be”; and “A person is justified in … using … deadly physical force against another to protect a third person if, under the circumstances as a reasonable person would believe them to be, such person would be justified under section 13-404 or 13-405 in threatening or using physical force or deadly physical force to protect himself against the unlawful physical force or deadly physical force a reasonable person would believe is threatening the third person he seeks to protect”; and “A person is justified in using physical force against another when and to the extent that a reasonable person would believe it necessary to prevent what a reasonable person would believe is an attempt or commission by the other person of … criminal damage involving tangible movable property under his possession or control, but such person may use deadly physical force under these circumstances as provided in sections 13-405, 13-406 and 13-411.”
8.    Pursuant to, inter alia, A.R.S. § 13-205: “Justification defenses … are not affirmative defenses… If evidence of justification … is presented by the defendant, as they have been in this instant case, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act with justification..” and “This section does not affect the presumption contained in section 13-411, subsection C..”
9.    The state has falsely claimed, as evidenced by the prosecutor’s statements in the first trial, that Kidnapper was justified in attacking Stuart because the two men had argued; the prosecutor’s statements violates, inter alia, A.R.S. § 13-404: “… The threat or use of physical force against another is not justified: … In response to verbal provocation alone…”
10.    The state has attempted to claim, falsely, that the state failed to collect certain pieces of evidence and cannot be held accountable for such since the police are not required to collect exculpatory evidence; when in fact during the investigation the state collected said evidence and had in its care, custody and possession, in one way or another, said evidence, and agents unlawfully destroyed said evidence. This evidence includes but is not limited to:

Stuart’s clothing;
Kidnapper’s body fluids and DNA on Stuart’s clothing;
Medical evidence of Stuart’s injuries;
Stuart’s blood sample;
The [state’s] rubber glove;
Kidnapper’s hair sample;
Kidnapper’s chipped tooth;
Evidence inside of  Stuart’s Toyota FJ Cruiser;
Evidence on the exterior of Stuart’s Toyota FJ Cruiser;
Kidnapper’s blood on Defendant’s holster;
Blood evidence.
11.            The state had in its care, custody and possession: Stuart’s clothing; Kidnapper’s body fluids and DNA on Stuart’s clothing; Medical evidence of Stuart’s injuries; Stuart’s blood sample; when the state had custody of Stuart.
12.            Dalton chose to commit a criminal act against Stuart and the State, in violation of his loyalty oath of office, to destroy said evidence when he unlawfully violated the lawful commands of the Search Warrant SW2008-000852 (“Warrant”). [See: Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), when an executive branch officer refused to act “…was both illegal and remediable…” and “…violative of a vested legal right.”

The Warrant states in relevant part: “YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED” (See: page 169 of police report).   The Warrant further states (See: pages 168, 173 and 172 of police report):
4) EXAMINATION AND COLLECTION OF BIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE, CONSISTING OF, BUT NOT LIMITED TO BLOODSTAINS, BODY FLUIDS, TISSUE AND HAIR
5) ANY ITEMS OF CLOTHING, POSSIBLY CONTAINING BLOOD AND/OR BIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE….
11) THE CLOTHING WORN BY JOHN C. STUART;
13) A BLOOD SAMPLE OF JOHN C. STUART.       

(Emphasis added)

13.    Dalton, in violation of Arizona law and international treaties concerning the treatment of prisoners, refused to allow Defendant to receive the needed and repeatedly requested medical assistance thereby destroying incontrovertible medical evidence and possible expert witness statements that would establish factually that Kidnapper had strangled and otherwise injured Defendant while Kidnapper kidnapped and was attempting to murder Defendant.
14.            Dalton’s criminal acts caused the destruction of exculpatory evidence that would have proven incontrovertibly that Kidnapper was inside of Stuart’s vehicle; which thereby would cause all charges against Stuart to be dismissed; as evidenced by the recent and almost exactly similar case of Arizona v. David Appleton CR2011-157855.
15.            The state and Korus had in its care, custody and possession the [State’s] rubber glove the State falsely claimed belonged to Stuart when in fact said rubber glove was supplied by and used by a state agent to alter evidence.
16.            Korus knowingly chose to purposefully commit a criminal act by destroying the [State’s] rubber glove so that Stuart could not prove the [State’s] rubber glove was used by and planted by a state agent.
17.            The State had in its care, custody and possession Kidnapper’s hair sample that would have proven incontrovertibly that Kidnapper was a frequent user of the illicit drug known as L.S.D./acid, a fact Kidnapper himself admitted to publicly; and was under the influence of said drug when he entered Stuart’s vehicle to murder Stuart after he had Kidnapped Stuart.
18.    Pursuant to, inter alia, A.R.S. § 13-4221: “…the appropriate governmental entity shall retain all identified biological evidence that is secured in connection with a homicide… “Biological evidence’ includes hair….”
19.     MCMEO and/or Lyons chose to commit a criminal act when they/he chose to destroy Kidnapper’s hair sample that was in the MCMEO’s and/or Lyon’s custody, in violation of, inter alia, A.R.S. § 13-4221.
20.    State agents also concealed and/or withheld Stuart’s FJ Cruiser from the defense for over 9 months by repeatedly giving Stuart false information concerning the whereabouts of the FJ Cruiser to prevent Stuart from inspecting the FJ Cruiser; and after state agents removed the tarp placed upon the FJ Cruiser to protect the exculpatory evidence on the inside and exterior of the FJ Cruiser.

IV                               JURISPRUDENCE
1.    Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)
        The Supreme Court of the United States decided in Marbury when an executive branch officer refused to act in accordance with lawful orders his actions and/or refusal to act “…was both illegal and remediable…” and “…violative of a vested legal right.”
        In this instant case Perpetrators Dalton and Korus are executive branch officers who violated their loyalty oath of office, and Arizona law, and Stuart’s substantive and Due Process of law rights, and the lawful commands of Warrant to purposefully destroy exculpatory evidence that would have prevented the State from charging and/or prosecuting Stuart and establish factually that Kidnapper kidnapped and attempted to murder Stuart.

 2.    a.    State v. Bible. 175 Ariz. 549, 600, 858 P.2d 1152, 1203 (1993).

We have routinely noted that a Prosecutor has an obligation not only to prosecute with diligence, but to seek justice. He must refrain from all use of improper methods designed solely to obtain a conviction." State v. Bible. 175 Ariz. 549, 600, 858 P.2d 1152, 1203 (1993) (while a prosecutor may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one') (Quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). Id. at 440. State v. Minnitt, 203 Ariz. 431, 440, L.F.2d 44-45, 55 P.3d 774, 783 (2002) (emphasis added); accord In re Peasley, 208 Ariz. 27, 42, H 65, 90 P.3d 764, 779 (2004). Trebus, 189 Ariz, at 624-625, 944 P.2d at 1238-39; Crimmins, 137 Ariz, at 4314, 668 P.3d at 886-87. As stated in Trebus: The interests of the prosecutor and the state are not limited to indictment but include serving the interests of justice; thus, the prosecutor's obligation to make a fair and impartial presentation to the jury has long been recognized. See Cummins. 137 Ariz, at 41, 668 P.2d at 884; see also State v. Emery. 131 Ariz. 493, 506, 642 P.2d 838, 851 (1982).           

(Emphasis added).



b.    O'Rarden v. State, 777 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. App-- Dallas             1989,     pet.ref d) (“prosecution team includes investigators”).

The Phoenix Police Department and all other investigative offices are part of the prosecutor’s team and any and all acts committed by Phoenix Police Officers and/or other offices in relation to this matter are also then committed by the prosecutor’s team.
3.            Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S J3, 83 S, Ct. (1963); Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 US 51 - Supreme Court 1988; Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97S, Ct. (1976); United Stales v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 S. Ct. (1985); and a plethora of other cases.
            The destruction of exculpatory evidence in the care, custody and possession of the state, purposeful or not, mandates the sole remedy of dismissal; and can demand dismissal with prejudice when the destruction and/or other acts are so egregious as to possibly prevent a defendant from receiving a fair trial.
            In this instant case all of the exculpatory evidence was purposefully destroyed by agents; and the exculpatory evidence destroyed was in the care, custody and possession of said agents; and the agents purposefully destroyed all of the exculpatory evidence while simultaneously only retaining evidence they could cause to appear inculpatory.   
            Absent said exculpatory evidence Stuart has absolutely no possibility of receiving a fair trial.
            The first trial establishes this claim as an unrebuttable fact since the prosecutor repeatedly used the fact the exculpatory evidence was destroyed to falsely claim said evidence was inculpatory in nature and that [paraphrased] “Stuart was required to provide exculpatory evidence to prove his innocence or the jury must convict Stuart;” as evidenced by the prosecutor’s own statements during the first trial.


V                        FILING MANDATORY
            Pursuant to, inter alia, A.R.S. §§ 12- 2041and 12-2042 the filing of a Quo Warranto by the State Attorney General and the Maricopa County Attorney is MANDATORY when requested by an individual because the statutes contain the word “SHALL” and not “may” in relevance to the filings.
            Pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) 12- 2041, et seq; “The attorney general shall bring the action…”; and “The county attorney shall bring the action…” “when he has reason to believe that any such office or franchise is being usurped, intruded into or unlawfully held or exercised.”

            See:   Merriam-Webster Dictionary: Shall: “…used in laws,                         regulations, or directives to express what is mandatory…”
            Stuart has supplied good and sufficient information; and the sworn statements by the Perpetrators and other evidence from the case at bar to establish factually that Perpetrators have incontrovertibly “…unlawfully ….exercised…” the authority of their offices to unlawfully destroy exculpatory evidence and deprive Stuart of his substantive rights and deny Stuart of Due Process of Law under color of state law.
            Any refusal to bring the requested Quo Warranto action by said elected officials violate Arizona laws and said elected officials’ loyalty oaths of office; and further deprive Stuart of his substantive rights and deny Stuart of Due Process of Law under color of state law; and also shall prevent Stuart from any possibility of receiving a fair trial in any Maricopa County and/or any other Arizona court. 
VI                RELEVANT QUO WARRANTO CASES                        See: STATE of Arizona ex rel. Ed SAWYER, A.V. Hardt, and Alfredo Gutierrez, Petitioners, v. John A. LaSOTA, Jr., Respondent. 19 Ariz. 253 (1978) 580 P.2d 714, No. 13778. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. June 6, 1978.

“By Art. 6, § 5, ¶ 1, of the Constitution of Arizona, the Supreme Court has "original jurisdiction of habeas corpus, and quo warranto, mandamus, injunction and other extraordinary writs to state officers." While the quoted language of Art. 6, § 5 is derived from the constitutional amendment adopted at the general election held November 8, 1960, from statehood this Court has had original jurisdiction in quo warranto and mandamus "as to all state officers." Art. 6, § 4, Constitution of Arizona, approved February 9, 1911. Accordingly, we construe the grant in Art. 6, § 5, ¶ 1, as meaning the power to issue extraordinary writs as under the common law of England.”

See also:  Buell v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 96 Ariz. 62, 391 P.2d 919 (1964): “…the Attorney General, like any other public officer, may not arbitrarily refuse to discharge the duties of his office. An original petition addressed to this Court will be given effect irrespective of its name.”

See also: Eggerth v. Forselius, 82 Ariz. 256, 311 P.2d 964 (1957). “Consequently, we examine the petition to determine if, as an application for a writ of mandamus, the Attorney General could be compelled to bring an action in which the dispute can be resolved. While mandamus is not available as a remedy to try to title to an office, the holder may be compelled by mandamus to perform the duties of his office.”

            In 1904, in Buggeln v. Doe, 8 Ariz. 341, 76 P. 458, under a Territorial statute similar in effect to A.R.S. § 12-2041, it was held:

"We think the statute authorizing an action in the nature of quo warranto does not make it mandatory upon the district attorney to institute such action, unless he has reason to believe that an office or franchise is being usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised. It is, however, his duty to bring such proceedings when facts are laid before him from which he can reasonably conclude that such franchise is being usurped. If, on such showing, he fails to institute such proceedings, his action can be reviewed upon an application for mandamus; * * *."
    This was followed by Duffield v. Ashurst, 12 Ariz. 360, 364, 100 P. 820, 822 (1909), in which the Court said:

"We have already had occasion to hold, in applying this statute, that, where the facts presented to the district attorney show as a matter of law that a franchise is unlawfully being exercised and are not in dispute, the refusal by the district attorney to institute the quo warranto proceedings is a violation of his duty, and that we may compel him to perform that duty by our writ of mandate."


VII                STANDING TO BRING ACTION
            Stuart has standing to bring action and/or request action be brought because Stuart “has a ‘personal stake’ in the outcome of a case.”
            See: Conrad JOYNER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rose MOFFORD, Secretary of State, State of Arizona; Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General, State of Arizona, Defendants-Appellants. 706 F.2d 1523 (1983) No. 82-5552. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted January 14, 1983. Decided May 23, 1983:

The standing doctrine derives from the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution, and "is the threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2204, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Courts require a plaintiff to have a "personal stake" in the outcome of a case "to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf." Id. at 498-99, 95 S.Ct. at 2204-05 (emphasis in original). To have such a "personal stake," a plaintiff must allege a "distinct and palpable injury to himself." Id.at 501, 95 S.Ct. at 2206. Such an injury can arise even from the burden of a statutory obligation. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 273, 99 S.Ct. 1102, 1108, 59 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979). In the present case, Joyner alleges a potential injury which is sufficient to meet the standing requirement — his obligation under Article 22, § 18 to resign or be removed from his state position if he runs for federal office.”
    And at *1533:  “These justifications are substantial, and reflect a legitimate and compelling state interest in orderly, consistent, and honest government. Cf. Anderson v. Celebrezze, U.S., 103 S.Ct. 1564 & n. 9, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983).”

VII    I                GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1.    John Does 1-100 may have assisted Perpetrators in some and/or all of Perpetrators criminal acts; and not in others; and may or may not have been aware of the conspiracy to frame Stuart through the purposeful destruction of exculpatory evidence.
2.            Stuart was Kidnapped, attacked, assault, injured, choked/strangled, temporarily partially blinded, and almost murdered by Kidnapper while Stuart was inside of Stuart’s own personal and private vehicle; and while “performing a political function” for a presidential candidate.
3.            Kidnapper was under the influence of alcohol (.19 B.A.C. and enough alcohol in his body to bring his B.A.C. to above .33 if he survived) and L.S.D. (Kidnapper’s favorite illicit drug pursuant to Kidnapper’s numerous public confessions) when Kidnapper attacked, kidnapped, attempted to murder Stuart; and seized control of Stuart’s vehicle; and interfered with Stuart’s performance of a “political function”.
4.            Kidnapper’s wife, Rebecca Beasley, was a co-conspirator/accessory  with Kidnapper and had the requisite knowledge of Kidnapper’s intention to commit numerous felonies and misdemeanors, including without limitations, driving under the influence; illicit drug use; crimes commonly known as “road rage”; and other crimes; and therefore should not be granted “Victim” status as Arizona law precludes a co-conspirator of violent crimes to be protected as a “Victim” of the crime said co-conspirator was conspiring to commit.
5.            Kidnapper’s wife, Rebecca Beasley, was granted “Victim” status as a means to prevent Stuart from deposing her and discovering her involvement and intent in the Kidnapping and attempted murder of Stuart.
6.            Korus purposefully destroyed the [State’s] rubber glove used to alter evidence then planted said [State’s] rubber glove in Stuart’s vehicle so Stuart could not prove Koru’s crime(s).
7.            Korus purposefully gave contradicting counts of the number of cartridges in the police report and while testifying under oath as a means to conceal his crime(s).
8.            Dalton purposefully violated the commands of a warrant and destroyed exculpatory evidence in his care, custody and possession to prevent Stuart from establishing factually that Kidnapper kidnapped, attacked Stuart and/or was mortally wounded while inside of Stuart’s vehicle.
9.            Dalton unlawfully prevented Stuart from receiving medical assistance as a means to destroy the exculpatory evidence of Stuart’s numerous injuries.
10.             Dalton falsely claimed Stuart’s neck was not injured and did not have red marks from Kidnapper’s attempt at strangling/choking Stuart.
11.         MCMEO failed to test Kidnapper’s body for the illicit drug L.S.D. and purposefully and unlawfully destroyed Kidnapper’s hair samples to prevent Stuart from establishing factually that Kidnapper was under the influence of the illicit drug L.S.D.
12.             Lyons failed to test Kidnapper’s body for the illicit drug L.S.D. and purposefully and unlawfully destroyed Kidnapper’s hair samples to prevent Stuart from establishing factually that Kidnapper was under the influence of the illicit drug L.S.D.
13.             Perpetrators committed numerous criminal and/or unlawful acts; including without limitations; destroying exculpatory evidence in their care, custody and possession; failing to collect evidence ordered collected; altering evidence; planting evidence; and other heinous acts to defraud the court and falsely prosecute Stuart by denying Stuart the protections granted by Arizona law as a victim attacked inside of his own vehicle.
14.             Stuart is being framed by corrupt state agents who have destroyed exculpatory evidence in their care, custody and possession as a means to falsely imprison Stuart and so Perpetrators will obtain pecuniary gain through criminal and/or unlawful acts.
15.             Any claim by Perpetrator(s) and/or their agent(s) that the State and/or its agents are not required to collect exculpatory evidence is moot and shall not be used to contradict any of the aforementioned allegations as all the said exculpatory evidence was collected and in the care, custody and possession of Perpetrators and/or the State previous to said exculpatory evidences’ purposeful destruction by said Perpetrators; as evidenced by Perpetrators’ statements, Perpetrators’ and/or state videos and/or reports.




IX                         CLAIM FOR RELIEF   (MANDAMUS)

        In this claim for relief, Stuart incorporates by reference and re-alleges all allegations and paragraphs of this pleading, as if they were fully set forth once again.
        The named Perpetrators; Dalton, Korus, Lyons, had the requisite knowledge of Arizona law and the unlawfulness of their criminal acts for this Court to determine factual that they are Scienters.
        The court and the State and Perpetrators are required to abide by the mandates created by Brady and its progeny.
        The court and the State and Perpetrators are required to abide by the mandates created by Bible and its progeny.
        The court and the State and Perpetrators are required to abide by the mandates created by Marbury and its progeny.
        Under Brady and its progeny the case against Stuart must be dismissed.
        Under Bible the prosecutor must seek justice and is prohibited from using unethical and/or criminal acts to obtain a conviction.
        Under Marbury Dalton’s actions were “both illegal and remediable…” and “…violative of a vested legal right.”
        Under Marbury Dalton’s actions were “…violative of a [Stuart’s] vested legal right[s].”
        Under Marbury Korus’ actions were “both illegal and remediable…” and “…violative of a vested legal right.”
         Under Marbury Korus’ actions were “…violative of a [Stuart’s] vested legal right[s].”
         Under Marbury MCMEO’s actions were “both illegal and remediable…” and “…violative of a vested legal right.”
         Under Marbury MCMEO’s actions were “…violative of a [Stuart’s] vested legal right[s].”
         Under Marbury Lyons’ actions were “both illegal and remediable…” and “…violative of a vested legal right.”
         Under Marbury Lyons’ actions were “…violative of a [Stuart’s] vested legal right[s].”
         Under Arizona Constitution Article II § 2.1 Stuart must be considered a victim and protected accordingly.
         Under Arizona Constitution Article II § 2.1 Rebecca Beasley cannot be considered a victim and cannot be protected as such since she is and was at all times relevant a co-conspirator to her husbands numerous crimes; including without limitations; driving while under the influence, kidnapping, attempted murder, and other crimes.
         Under the relevant statutes of A.R.S. §§ 13-401, et seq, especially 13-418, Stuart is deemed JUSTIFIED by the State and the court in any and all acts he may or may not have committed to survive and/or escape the kidnapping and attempted murder of his person and the person of the third party occupant.
         Under A.R.S. § 13-1304 Kidnapper is deemed by the State and the court as having Kidnapped Stuart and Stuart’s third party occupant.
         Under the relevant statutes Kidnapper is deemed by the State and the court as having attempted to murder Stuart and Stuart’s third party occupant.
     Under A.R.S. § 13-205 the State and the court must acknowledge that justification defenses are not affirmative defenses.
     Under A.R.S. § 13-4221 MCMEO committed a criminal act when it destroyed Kidnapper’s hair sample.
     Under A.R.S. § 13-4221 Lyons committed a criminal act when he destroyed Kidnapper’s hair sample.
    Under the relevant statutes of A.R.S. §§ 13-401, et seq, Kidnapper is PRESUMED to have been attempting to murder Stuart.
    Under the relevant statutes of A.R.S. §§ 13-401, et seq, Stuart’s actions are PRESUMED to be reasonable.
     Under A.R.S. § 13-2041, et seq, Stuart is entitled to have the Attorney General file a Quo Warranto action; as requested by Stuart.
     Under A.R.S. § 13-2042, et seq, the County Attorney shall file a Quo Warranto action; as requested by Stuart.
     The State and/or county agents have a legal duty to perform a ministerial act, having no discretion in the manner of its performance.  A writ of mandamus / quo warranto will therefore compel them to act, and may tell them how to act.

X               JUDCICIAL NOTICE
    Additional information and/or other egregious acts Stuart moves this honorable Court to take Judicial Notice of Pursuant to Rules of Evidence 201.
1.    a.    Former Maricopa County Attorney Andrew Thomas (“Thomas”) made numerous false and disparaging allegations against Stuart to the media in his criminal attempt to prejudice any future jury.
    b.    Thomas also publicly stated he would raise Stuart’s bond, which he did without cause and without right even though Stuart had never violated any release conditions.
2.    a.    Charbel committed perjury to Judge Baca to obtain a warrant to falsely arrest and wrongfully imprison Stuart. Charbel falsely claimed the I.R.S. had confiscated Stuart’s bond when in fact the I.R.S. did not and never intended on confiscating said bond.
    b.    Charbel had Stuart falsely charged, falsely arrested and wrongfully imprisoned for his attorney entering a document into evidence. Stuart is the first and only person in U.S. history ever imprisoned for their attorney entering evidence into a court case.
    c.    Charbel had the defense’s primary witness, Stuart’s former fiancée Ms. Cantrell, falsely charged and wrongfully imprisoned for perjury as a means to intimidate Ms. Cantrell into being too scared to testify in any future trial.

    d.    Charbel directed State witness and former defense team paralegal Carla Bartschi (“Bartschi”) to lie to the defense during their interview of Bartschi and falsely claim she was not a paralegal. Charbel was well aware at the time that Bartschi was and is a paralegal and worked on Stuart’s case as a paralegal but wanted to use Bartschi as a witness against Stuart because Bartschi was willing to commit perjury as a means to get revenge on Stuart for his refusing to date her. Bartschi is a known member of a terrorist group planning the violent overthrow of the United States government. Charbel has unlawfully interfered with criminal and/or state civil cases against Bartschi so as to prevent Bartschi from being imprisoned so she can testify and commit perjury against Stuart in any future trial.
    e.    Charbel directed State witness and former defense team paralegal Bartschi to file false charges against Stuart in an attempt to have Stuart once again falsely arrested and wrongfully imprisoned. See: FN2011-050784: Bartschi Vs. Stuart.
    f.    Charbel directed State witness and former defense team paralegal Bartschi to threaten Stuart. These threats were recorded and Stuart attempted to enter them into evidence but for some unknown reason the Court denied the request.
    g.    Charbel directed State witness and former defense team paralegal Bartschi to threaten defense witness Jasmine Bartschi, Bartschi’s daughter, as a means to intimidate Jasmine Bartschi into not testifying. Bartschi told Jasmine Bartschi and other family members that if Jasmine Bartschi comes to court to testify she would be arrested; just as the other defense witness was falsely arrested.
    h.    Charbel repeatedly suborned perjury and solicited perjury from state witnesses during trial by leading them into providing testimony Charbel knew was false. Charbel knew and had evidence and information the following allegations were not true, yet Charbel repeatedly solicited testimony controverting what Charbel knew was factual;  i) that there was blood on Kidnappers vehicle; and ii) Kidnappers body was not moved; and iii) the shell casing was not moved.
    i.    Charbel purposefully lied to the jury by claiming, [paraphrased]; “that since Stuart could not provide evidence proving his innocence the jury must convict him.” This claim is particularly egregious since it was Charbel’s co-conspirators and Charbel that purposefully destroyed all the evidence that proved Stuart was and is innocent and/or justified pursuant to Arizona law.
    j.    Charbel purposefully lied to the jury by claiming, [paraphrased]; “that ‘Kidnapper’ was just a normal Joe and did not do drugs as evidenced by the fact Stuart’s investigator could not discover evidence of ‘Kidnapper’s’ drug use.” This claim is particularly egregious since it was Charbel that argued to prevent the evidence of Kidnapper’s life long history of illicit drug use being used during the trial. Charbel was well aware previous to trial that Kidnapper was a frequent and long term user of the illicit drug L.S.D. and other illicit drugs.
    Charbel’s actions during trial constitute purposeful ‘invited error’ are and good and sufficient cause for this Court to demand the case be dismissed and jeopardy attached.

See: State v. Rasch, 935 P.2d 887: 
Although, in general, jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled, State v. Soloman, 125 Ariz. 18, 21, 607 P.2d 1, 4 (1980), the double jeopardy clause does not ordinarily bar retrial when a court grants a mistrial on defendant's motion. State v. Wilson, 134 Ariz. 551, 554, 658 P.2d 204, 207 (App. 1982).[3] Nevertheless, when the prosecutor knowingly engages in improper and prejudicial conduct indifferent to the fact that such conduct will likely result in a mistrial or dismissal, the court must order a mistrial and jeopardy will attach. Pool v. Superior Ct., 139 Ariz. 98, 108-09, 677 P.2d 261, 271-72 (1984). Before jeopardy will bar a retrial after a mistrial, the court must find that the prosecutor's conduct was intentional conduct that caused prejudice to the defendant and could not be cured by means short of a mistrial. Id. at 109, 677 P.2d at 272. The double jeopardy clause protects defendants "against [both] governmental actions intended to provoke mistrial requests and ... the substantial burdens imposed by multiple prosecutions." State v. Marquez, 113 Ariz. 540, 542, 558 P.2d 692, 694 (1976).


3.    The Court and/or the State unlawfully forced Stuart to accept a public defender even after Stuart repeatedly refused orally and in writing said public defender. Judge Paul McMurdie unlawfully forced Stuart through a Rule 11 procedure without cause and without right and then after Stuart was deemed competent by the Rule 11 doctors; Judge McMurdie ordered that if Stuart did not accept the public defender then he would falsely imprison Stuart for contempt of court and make him represent himself from jail.
4.    The case has been repeatedly and unlawfully continued against Stuart’s oral and written objections in violation of, inter alia, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedures Rule 6.3(C) and Maricopa County Local Rules 4.5(B)(1 & 2) and 4.1 and Speedy Trial Rights.
5.    To date, of the last approximately 140 motions entered by Stuart all but 4 have been denied sua sponte without a finding of fact and conclusion of law and without Charbel even responding to any of them. Judge Kreamer ordered Stuart to enter a motion based on the transcripts of the officer(s) Stuart claims committed perjury and stated that if Stuart did enter said motion that he would rule on the motion. Stuart did enter said motion pursuant to Judge Kreamer’s order and Judge Kreamer then refused to rule on the motion and set the motion aside for the trial judge to rule. Said motion proves incontrovertibly that Korus committed perjury and purposefully destroyed exculpatory evidence in his custody. See: Motion in Limine to preclude Det. Koru, entered on August 29, 2012.
6.    Stuart testified in open court in the federal case against Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio (“Arpaio”) and has repeatedly moved the Court for a change of venue as it is improper for Stuart to be tried in the county controlled by the person Stuart testified against. This Court and most Arizonans are well aware of Arpaio’s long and storied history of using threats to control Maricopa County Courts and Judges into convicting innocent people that have spoken publicly against him. It is a functional impossibility for Stuart to receive a fair trial or even appear he will or has received a fair trial in any court in Maricopa County.

XI         PETITIONER STUART’S STATEMENT OF FACTS
    A.    On or about 9pm of the evening of January 29, 2008, Stuart and Stuart’s then fiancé were attacked in Stuart’s vehicle by Kidnapper while Stuart was stopped at a stoplight and while Stuart and his then fiancé were performing the “political function” of hanging banners for a presidential candidate.
    B.    Several people during the incident and subsequent to the incident did commit numerous criminal and felonious acts against Stuart, the body politic, the State, the Court and/or the people of Arizona as a whole; but at no time and in no way were any acts committed by Stuart considered a crime by Arizona and/or U.S. law.

                   Petitioner / Stuart   
1.     Survived but sustained multiple injuries to his neck and eye during the kidnapping and attempted murder of his person and that of his then fiancé; and
2.     Escaped and retreated from the kidnapping and murder attempt after Kidnapper was mortally wounded; and then Stuart took his then fiancé to a safe location so she could retreat to the police; but at no time did Stuart flee from or attempt to evade police and/or arrest; and
3.     Attempted to retreat from the deadly attack and even rammed another vehicle in his attempt to retreat before Kidnapper was mortally wounded inside of Stuart’s vehicle; and
4.     Contacted his attorney and was speaking with his attorney and was on his way to his attorney’s home when Stuart was stopped and unlawfully arrested, not just detained, by Phoenix Police Officers.

                    Kidnapper
1.     Seized control of Stuart’s vehicle; and
2.     Attempted to remove Stuart from Stuart’s vehicle by Stuart’s neck through the open window of Stuart’s vehicle; and
3.     Attempted to murder Stuart inside of Stuart’s vehicle; and
4.     Injured Stuart by gouging at Stuart’s eye and strangling Stuart; and
5.     Had a B.A.C. of .19 and an additional 600ml of fluid inside his body which would have caused his B.A.C. to be approximately .32 within approximately and hour; and
6.     Was “high on” L.S.D. at the time he kidnapped and attempted to murder Stuart. (this cannot be proven because the state agents purposefully and unlawfully destroyed the evidence,[Kidnapper’s hair sample, see: A.R.S. § 13-4221] that would have established this factually, but other evidence establishes factually that Kidnapper used L.S.D. on a very frequent basis);
vii) Became mortally wounded while partially inside of Stuart’s vehicle and while attempting to murder Stuart and while screaming “I am going to kill you”.

Police officers did collect and have in their care, custody and possession the following pieces of evidence:

        Stuart’s Toyota FJ Cruiser – evidences Kidnapper was mortally wounded inside of Stuart’s vehicle;
        Evidence inside of the FJ Cruiser – evidences Kidnapper was mortally wounded inside of Stuart’s vehicle;
        Evidence on the exterior of the FJ Cruiser– evidences Kidnapper was mortally wounded inside of Stuart’s vehicle;
        Stuart’s clothing – Kidnapper’s DNA and blood on clothing evidences Kidnapper was mortally wounded inside of Stuart’s vehicle;
        Kidnapper’s body fluids and DNA on Defendant’s clothing – evidences Kidnapper was mortally wounded inside of Stuart’s vehicle;
        Medical evidence of Stuart’s injuries – evidences Kidnapper did violently assault and attempted to murder Stuart;
        Stuart’s holster – evidences the Glock was ripped from and not normally removed from holster;
        Kidnapper’s blood on Stuart’s holster – evidences Kidnapper was mortally wounded inside of Stuart’s vehicle;
        Stuart’s blood sample – evidences Stuart was completely sober when kidnapped and attacked by Kidnapper;
        Stuart’s urine sample– evidences Stuart was completely sober when kidnapped and attacked by Kidnapper;
       Stuart’s Glock – evidences someone planted a police issued cartridge in the Glock;
       Stuart’s Glock magazine– evidences someone planted a police issued cartridge in the Glock;
       Stuart’s cartridges– evidences someone planted a police issued cartridge in the Glock;
  The police issued cartridge inserted into the Glock’s chamber – evidences state agents planted evidence to frame Stuart;
       The State’s rubber glove – state agents planted evidence to frame Stuart;
       Blood evidence – evidences Kidnapper was mortally wounded inside of Stuart’s vehicle;
       Kidnapper’s hair sample – evidences Kidnapper’s illicit drug usage;
       Kidnapper’s chipped tooth – evidences Kidnapper and Stuart did struggle during the kidnapping and attempted murder of Stuart by Kidnapper.

Police officers did UNLAWFULLY destroy, lose, alter, conceal, and/or withhold from the defense the following pieces of exculpatory evidence in their attempt to frame Stuart and/or prevent Stuart from access to the “justification defenses” provided by Arizona law

    Stuart’s Toyota FJ Cruiser – evidences Kidnapper was mortally wounded inside of Stuart’s vehicle;
    Evidence inside of the FJ Cruiser – evidences Kidnapper was mortally wounded inside of Stuart’s vehicle;
       Evidence on the exterior of the FJ Cruiser– evidences Kidnapper was mortally wounded inside of Stuart’s vehicle;
    Stuart’s clothing – Kidnapper’s DNA and blood on clothing evidences Kidnapper was mortally wounded inside of Stuart’s vehicle;
    Kidnapper’s body fluids and DNA on Defendant’s clothing – evidences Kidnapper was mortally wounded inside of Stuart’s vehicle;
    Medical evidence of Stuart’s injuries – evidences Kidnapper did violently assault and attempted to murder Stuart;
    Kidnapper’s blood on Stuart’s holster – evidences Kidnapper was mortally wounded inside of Stuart’s vehicle;
    Stuart’s blood sample – evidences Stuart was completely sober when kidnapped and attacked by Kidnapper;
    Stuart’s urine sample– evidences Stuart was completely sober when kidnapped and attacked by Kidnapper;
     The police issued cartridge inserted into the Glock’s chamber – evidences state agents planted evidence to frame Stuart;
     Blood evidence – evidences Kidnapper was mortally wounded inside of Stuart’s vehicle;
     Kidnapper’s hair sample – evidences Kidnapper’s illicit drug usage;
     Kidnapper’s chipped tooth – evidences Kidnapper and Stuart did struggle during the kidnapping and attempted murder of Stuart by Kidnapper.

Korus did “…unlawfully…exercise …a public office…” to frame an innocent man
1.     Korus photographed and collected a rubber glove he falsely claimed was inside of the FJ when he arrived; and
2.     Korus destroyed said rubber glove to prevent the defense from testing it and proving said rubber glove was in fact Korus’ rubber glove that he used to plant the police issued cartridge in the Glock; and
3.     Korus made contradictory statements in the police repot and then while testifying under oath in the trial also made contradictory statements concerning the number of cartridges in the Glock magazine, thereby committing perjury by inconsistent statements pursuant to, inter alia, A.R.S. § 13-2705. Korus’ statements evidence that he became confused as to the number of cartridges when he was planting the police issued cartridge in the Glock. 

    Dalton did “…unlawfully…exercise …a public office…” to frame an innocent man
1.     Dalton committed perjury to both Grand Juries to obtain an indictment based on false pretenses by falsely claiming witnesses did not inform him or any other officer that they saw Kidnapper attack Stuart inside of the FJ, see: transcripts of both Grand Jury proceedings; and
2.     Dalton conspired with Charbel to conceal and withhold the FJ from the defense until all exculpatory evidence on and inside the FJ was destroyed; and
3.     Dalton violated the lawful commands of a warrant ordering him to maintain evidence in his care, custody and possession because the evidence was exculpatory in nature and would have established factually Stuart was and is innocent.
4.     Dalton falsely claimed to be a “blood spatter expert” when in fact Dalton is not such an expert; and used prosecutorial vouching so he could present false and misleading information to the jury.
5.     Dalton committed perjury by claiming that Glocks eject cartridges to the “right and rear” w